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WHY ARBITRATORS NOT JUDGES? 
Comments on the European Commission’s approach to investor-state arbitration 
in TTIP and CETA 
Gus Van Harten 
Associate Professor 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
gvanharten@osgoode.yorku.ca  
3 July 2014 
I respond to the European Commission’s invitation for comment on its approach to investment 
protection and investor-state arbitration in the proposed EU-United States Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP). I am a Canadian academic specializing in international 
investment law and am grateful for the opportunity to comment. Further information on the 
consultation is available here: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=179.  
The consultation does not ask the essential question: why is investor-state arbitration necessary 
in TTIP or CETA? To answer this question rigorously would require a careful framing of the 
question and comprehensive assessment of economic, political, and legal aspects of the use and 
impact of investor-state arbitration. For example, the consultation would need to examine: 
• the costs and benefits of investor-state arbitration in broad terms;
• the implications of investor-state arbitration for principles such as democratic choice,
regulatory flexibility, and market efficiency;
• the compatibility of investor-state arbitration with values of judicial decision-making
including, for example, values of judicial independence, openness, and procedural
fairness; and
• the relative utility and role of alternative means – such as domestic and European courts,
state-to-state adjudication, and market mechanisms including investment contracts and
risk insurance – to protect foreign investors; and
The consultation is not framed to address any of these issues. As a result, it is not designed to 
obtain a wide range of available evidence and information that would cast doubt on or outright 
contradict common claims of proponents of investor-state arbitration that: 
• treaty-based investor-state arbitration encourages foreign investment, contributes to
market freedom, or encourages “good governance”;
• states were well-informed when they entered into large numbers of investment treaties in
the past;
• foreign investors are at a political disadvantage relative to domestic investors and other
actors;
• domestic courts in any given country mistreat or discriminate against foreign investors;
• arbitrators have applied investment treaties in a balanced way; and
• investor-state arbitration is a neutral and independent process of adjudication.
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These claims are all open to significant doubt based on evidence and argument that will not be 
heard because the Commission has not posed the essential question. Indeed, I am aware of 
colleagues who have extensive relevant evidence but who have opted not to participate in the 
consultation because the essential question was not asked. 
In turn, without a strong case – based on careful evaluation of evidence and fulsome exchange of 
views – for granting special rights and privileges to foreign investors relative to all other actors, 
investor-state arbitration should not be included in the TTIP. Giving a special status to any actor 
in law or access to public funds, especially the largest (especially U.S.-based) companies in the 
world,1 calls for a clear justification based on positive evidence that doing so will deliver a 
public benefit to outweigh the disadvantages to other actors and costs to the public. Otherwise, 
the Commission would be proceeding with a major expansion of investor-state arbitration – 
extending its coverage of international FDI flows by about 300% of its current coverage based 
on existing treaties – without a careful review of the significant risks to public funds and 
regulatory capacity; to the principle of a level playing field for European and extra-European 
companies; and to established structures of public accountability, regulatory flexibility, and 
judicial independence. 
The remainder of this submission is narrowly focused due to the limited parameters of the 
consultation text. Many of the issues discussed arise from relatively minor concerns about textual 
clarification and from the Commission’s limited proposals to reform investor-state arbitration. In 
the comment, I have used in-text citations that are easily followed up by an online search; further 
references for any statement in this comment are available on request. 
1 Approximately 54% of the total compensation awarded (about $5.1 billion) in the 38 known investment 
treaty awards of over $10 million up to June 2, 2014 was awarded to U.S. companies. 97% of this 
compensation was awarded to U.S. companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenue. The U.S. 
share of total compensation in these cases rises to about 59% after accounting for apparent forum-
shopping.  
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General response to the Commission’s Introduction 
In its Introduction, the Commission puts far too much faith in its ability, through textual 
clarifications, to reign in arbitrators and their expansive tendencies. Investor-state arbitration is a 
cat-and-mouse game that favours the arbitrators – most importantly, a few dozen repeat players 
who have driven interpretation of the treaties – who are not subject to judicial override if they 
interpret a treaty incorrectly or unreasonably and who have a track record of exploiting legal 
ambiguity to expand their power over states, investors, public money, and so on. 
On the state’s right to regulate, if the Commission intends to affirm and protect this right, it must 
say so clearly and unequivocally in the treaty alongside the treaty’s elaborate rights for foreign 
investors. It is insufficient, indeed damaging, to affirm the right to regulate only as part of an 
aspirational statement in a preamble or elsewhere in the treaty. Likewise, the Commission’s 
statement in the consultation text that it intends to affirm the right to regulate is useless legally 
and misleading to the public; the statement must be included in the treaty itself as a substantive 
right of the state which has been agreed by the states parties. 
Some of the Commission’s specific statements about textual clarifications are misleading, 
especially with respect to foreign investors’ expansively-interpreted right to “fair and equitable 
treatment” and the corresponding impact of this right on the scope and reliability of the state’s 
ability to take legislative, regulatory, and judicial decisions free from onerous fiscal liability. 
Specific response to the Commission’s Introduction 
Statements in the consultation text Comments 
PDF version, page 2: “Investment protection 
provisions consist of a limited number of 
standards guaranteeing that governments will 
respect certain fundamental principles of 
treatment that a foreign investor can rely upon 
when making a decision to invest. These 
fundamental principles of treatment are 
reflected in the rights that democratic 
governments grant to their own citizens and 
companies (such as no expropriation without 
compensation, access to justice, protection 
against coercion and harassment, non-
discrimination), but they are not always 
guaranteed for foreigners or foreign 
companies.” 
If these fundamental principles are granted in 
democratic countries, then why is investor-
state arbitration required as an add-on to 
domestic courts in those countries? 
Presumably, in many or most cases, foreign 
investors enjoy protection in relation to these 
principles in democratic countries. If so, 
foreign investors should be required, like any 
other foreign national, to go to domestic courts 
before bringing an international claim unless 
they can show that the courts would not 
guarantee compensation for expropriation, 
access to justice, and so on. 
Otherwise, the assumption is that domestic 
courts in all affected countries systematically 
do not offer justice to foreign investors. This is 
3 
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clearly incorrect even if one assumed that 
investor-state arbitration itself provided fair 
and independent adjudication in the manner of 
a domestic or regional court in a democratic 
state. 
 
If there is a wider concern that domestic courts 
take too long or are otherwise insufficient to 
protect foreign investors, then the answer is to 
replace courts with arbitrators for everyone 
including domestic persons and foreigners who 
are not investors. The far-reaching 
consequences of this proposition itself reveal 
how radical is the use of investor-state 
arbitration without any duty to resort to 
domestic courts where they offer justice and 
are reasonably-available. To be clear, the 
Commission’s proposals do not include this 
basic duty to resort to domestic remedies, 
which applies in all comparable international 
courts and tribunals where individuals can 
bring an international claim against a state in 
its sovereign capacity. 
 
 
PDF version, page 2: “At the same time 
foreign investors, just as domestic ones, must 




This raises an important question: what if a 
foreign investor does not fully respect the 
domestic legal regime and the country’s 
domestic courts are inadequate to ensure that it 
does?  
 
One can imagine many scenarios in which 
domestic actors, other foreigners, or other 
foreign investors would suffer because of a 
foreign companies’ misconduct. Yet these 
other actors would be limited to the presumed 
ghetto of domestic courts with no right to opt 
out of the domestic legal system in favour of 
individual-state arbitration. This reveals the 
one-sidedness of investor-state arbitration in 
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PDF version, page 2: “The overall purpose of 
international investment agreements is to 
ensure that the country hosting an investment 
treats foreign investors in accordance with 
these fundamental principles, while 
maintaining the right to take measures for the 
public good according to the level of ambition 
that they deem appropriate.” 
 
 
If the purpose is to ensure treatment of foreign 
investors in accordance with fundamental 
principles of justice and non-discrimination, 
then foreign investors alone should not have 
special access to an adjudicative process where 
for-profit arbitrators instead of judges decide 
the investor’s entitlement to public money. 
 
If the intent really is to maintain the right of a 
state to take measures for the public good, 
according to the level of ambition that the state 
deems appropriate, then this must be stated 
clearly and unequivocally in the treaty text as a 
substantive right of the state. It is not in the 
Commission’s proposals based on the Canada-
EU CETA. It is highly misleading for the 
Commission to declare this intention in a 
consultation document but not include it as a 
substantive right of states in the treaty. 
 
 
PDF version, page 2: “The specific EU 
objective in our trade and investment 
agreements, or in the investment protection 
section of the TTIP, is to strengthen the 
balance between investment protection and the 
right to regulate, through clarifying and 
improving the substantive investment 
protection provisions while at the same time 
preserving the right of States to take measures 
for legitimate public policy objectives.” 
 
 
Again, if this is the intent, it must be stated 
clearly and unequivocally in the treaty. That is, 
a clear and unequivocal statement of the right 
to regulate must be included in the text – not 
only as an aspirational statement in a preamble 
or elsewhere – alongside the many elaborate 
rights for foreign investors. 
 
For examples of a clear statement of the right 
to regulate, see Article 12 of the Havana 
Charter of 1948 and the second paragraph of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
 
PDF version, page 2: “More precisely, the EU 
is introducing modern and innovative 
provisions clarifying the meaning of those 
investment protection standards that have 
raised concerns in the past, notably: fair and 
equitable treatment (which in the EU's 
approach will be limited to a closed list of 
basic rights for investors) and indirect 
expropriation (which in the EU's approach will 
 
The Commissions’ clarification in the Canada-
EU CETA of some aspects of the substantive 
standards, primarily indirect expropriation, is 
an improvement. 
 
On the other hand, the Commission’s 
clarification on fair and equitable treatment 
codifies a major expansion of this term 
compared to its widely-accepted customary 
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ensure that measures taken for legitimate 
public policy objectives cannot be considered 
to be an indirect expropriation). Under the 
EU's approach, the right to regulate is 
confirmed as a basic underlying principle. The 
EU also wants to ensure that all necessary 
exceptions and safeguards are in place, thus 
retaining essential public policy space for 
example to deal with a financial crisis.”  
 
meaning before the investor-state arbitrators 
came on the scene about 15 years ago. In 
particular, the Commission’s approach expands 
significantly the meaning of fair and equitable 
treatment as accepted by Canada, the U.S. and 
Mexico in the NAFTA context. Thus, the 
Commission endorses the arbitrators’ power 
grab on fair and equitable treatment and, in 
turn, heightens the risk to the right to regulate. 
 
In this and other ways, the Commission’s 
approach has undermined, not affirmed, the 
right to regulate. If the EU wishes to retain 
policy space for the state, it needs to include a 
statement of the right to regulate that applies to 
all standards of investor protection in the treaty 
and that is not limited to any particular area of 
decision-making such as financial regulation. 
The text is far from this basic balancing of the 
state’s right to regulate and foreign investors’ 
rights and protections. This makes it more not 
less likely that arbitrators will continue to 
erode the right to regulate in their application 
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General response to Question 1: Scope of the substantive investment protection provisions 
Question: [W]hat is your opinion of the objectives and approach taken in relation to the scope of 
the substantive investment protection provisions in TTIP?  
 
The Commission’s approach to the substantive investment provisions is inadequate and in some 
respects damaging. The Commission alludes to the serious problem of past abuse of investor-
state arbitration including by arbitrators themselves. Yet the Commission offers only limited and 
incomplete fixes based on unsubstantiated (and sometimes erroneous) claims about past 
arbitrator decision-making. 
 
My coding of awards – with the support of law students acting as research assistants – indicates a 
strong tendency of the arbitrators to prefer expansive (pro-claimant) approaches even in the face 
of relatively clear treaty language favouring restraint.2 The Commission’s proposed clarifications 
are a weak response to that record. It is as if the purpose of the Commission is to pretend to 
reform arbitrator power in order, at all costs, to preserve it. 
 
Specific response to Question 1: Scope of the substantive investment protection provisions 
 






PDF version, page 3: “At the same time, most 
bilateral investment agreements refer to 
“investments made in accordance with 
applicable law”. This reference has worked 
well and has allowed ISDS tribunals to refuse 
to grant investment protection to investors who 
have not respected the law of the host state 
when making the investment (for example, by 
structuring the investment in such a way as to 
circumvent clear prohibitions in the law of the 
host state, or by procuring an investment 
fraudulently or through bribery).” 
 
 
The Commission does not refer to any treaties 
or arbitration decisions to substantiate its 
claim. 
 
My own systematic research appears not to 
support the Commission’s claim. With three 
research assistants, I reviewed publicly-
available awards in 140 known cases to May-
June 2010 to identify how a tribunal appeared 
to allocate the onus on the issue of whether an 
investment was permissible due to alleged non-
compliance with domestic law or corruption. 
We found nine cases in which the issue was 
decided one way or the other, only three of 
which appear to support the Commission’s 
claim that the language noted here “has worked 
2 See G. Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration (Oxford: OUP, 2013) gb; G. Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical 
Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2012) 50 OHLJ 211.  
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well” to avoid circumvention of domestic law 
or counteract fraud or bribery.3 The remaining 
six cases appear to contradict the 
Commission’s claim.4 
 
If the Commission wished to ensure that 
investments circumventing domestic law or 
depending on fraud or bribery are not 
protected, it should say so clearly and 
unequivocally in the treaty. The Canada-EU 
CETA, as presented by the Commission, does 
not include such statements. If they could not 
be negotiated with Canada, what likelihood is 
there that the Commission will negotiate them 
with the United States? 
 
 
PDF version, page 3: “The EU wants to avoid 
abuse [i.e. investor claims based on mailbox or 
shell companies]. This is achieved primarily by 
improving the definition of “investor”, thus 
eliminating so –called “shell” or “mailbox” 
companies owned by nationals of third 
countries from the scope: in order to qualify as 
a legitimate investor of a Party, a juridical 
person must have substantial business activities 
in the territory of that Party.” 
 
 
I commend the Commission for recognizing 
that some investment treaty claims, including 
under European investment treaties, have been 
abusive due to the use of shell companies to 
manipulate investor nationality. Many 
arbitrators have allowed this abuse with 
significant implications for public budgets and 
the reliability of the right to regulate. 
 
 
PDF version, page 3: “At the same time, the 
EU wants to rely on past treaty practice with a 
proven track record. The reference to 
“investments made in accordance with the 
applicable law” is one such example. Another 
is the clarification that protection is only 
granted in situations where investors have 
already committed substantial resources in the 
host state - and not when they are simply at the 
 
Again, the Commission does not include 
references to substantiate its claim about past 
treaty practice. The results of our systematic 
coding of awards, mentioned above, appear to 
contradict the claim. 
 
Limiting the scope of investment protection to 
investors who own assets, rather than those 
merely planning to do so, is useful. Yet, if the 
3 Yaung Chi Oo v Myanmar (31 March 2003, para 27 and 53-63); Fraport v Philippines (16 August 2007, 
para 315, 319, 327, 333, 343-8, 350-6, 394-6, 402, and 404); Plama v Bulgaria (27 August 2008, para 
112-39). 
4 Olguín v Paraguay (8 August 2000, para 28); Swembalt v Latvia (23 October 2010, para 32-5); Aguas 
del Tunari v Bolivia (21 October 2005, para 188-92 and 204); Desert Line Projects v Yemen (6 February 
2008, para 99, 102, 105-6, 109, and 116); Rumeli v Kazakhstan (29 July 2008, para 318-29); and Siemens 
v Argentina (where Argentina was reportedly not permitted to introduce evidence and argument on the 
issue of alleged corrupt activities by the claimant). 
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stage where they are planning to do so.” 
 
goal was to check abuse of shell companies to 
manipulate investor nationality, this can and 
would need to be addressed directly and 




General response to Question 2: Non-discriminatory treatment for investors 
 
Question: [W]hat is your opinion of the EU approach to non –discrimination in relation to the 
TTIP? Please explain. 
 
The Commission’s approach to non-discrimination provisions is flawed. It undermines the goal 
of a level market playing field and the state’s right to regulate. 
 
On national treatment, the Commission reaffirms the practice of discriminating inappropriately 
in favour of foreign investors at the expense of domestic investors. 
 
On MFN treatment, the Commission appears unaware of or unconcerned by the threat posed by 
past expansive interpretations of MFN treatment. In particular, the Canada-EU CETA text does 
not reflect the Commission’s stated intent to block arbitrators from using the MFN standard to 
import substantive standards from other treaties. This creates significant uncertainty for states 
and investors and jeopardizes all of the Commission’s textual clarifications of fair and equitable 
treatment and indirect expropriation. It provides abundant opportunity for creating lawyering and 
adventurous interpretation. It raises questions about the Commission’s understanding of MFN 
treatment and its interaction with other treaty standards. 
 
Specific response to Question 2: Non-discriminatory treatment for investors 
 
 






PDF version, page 4: “This [non-
discrimination standard] ensures a level 
playing field between foreign investors and 




The non-discrimination standard does not 
ensure a level playing field between foreign 
and domestic (or third-state) investors. It 
guarantees that foreign investors receive “no 
less favourable treatment” than other investors, 
thus allowing more favourable treatment for 
foreign investors. This establishes the principle 
of an un-level playing field in favour of the 
foreign investor. 
 
To ensure a level playing field, investment 
treaties would need to (a) state this intention 
clearly and (b) prohibit discrimination based 
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on investor nationality. Where a treaty 
prohibits less favourable treatment for foreign 
investors, this indicates an intention to allow 
discrimination against domestic investors. 
 
 
PDF version, page 4: “The standards of 
national treatment and most-favoured nation 
(MFN) treatment are considered to be key 
provisions of investment agreements and 
therefore they have been consistently included 
in such agreements, although with some 
variation in substance.” 
 
 
The language of both national treatment and 
MFN treatment needs to be overhauled so as 
not to favour foreign over domestic investors. 
For example, MFN treatment has been used by 
arbitrators to transplant dispute resolution and 
substantive provisions from other treaties. This 
needs to be controlled in clear and unequivocal 
terms, as discussed below. 
 
 
PDF version, page 4: “The situation is 
different with regard to the right of 
establishment, where the Parties may choose 
whether or not to open certain markets or 
sectors, as they see fit.” 
 
 
It is positive that the Commission has 
committed to accept this flexibility in relation 
to pre-establishment national treatment (so-
called right of establishment). It is an open 
question whether the U.S. would agree to this 
position given its past insistence on pre-




PDF version, page 4: “Regarding MFN, most 
investment agreements do not clarify whether 
foreign investors are entitled to take advantage 
of procedural or substantive provisions 
contained in other past or future agreements 
concluded by the host country. Thus, investors 
may be able to claim that they are entitled to 
benefit from any provision of another 
agreement that they consider to be more 
favourable, which may even permit the 
application of an entirely new standard of 
protection that was not found in the original 
agreement. In practice, this is commonly 
referred to as ‘importation of standards’.”  
 
PDF version, page 4: “On the "importation of 
standards" issue, the EU seeks to clarify that 
MFN does not allow procedural or substantive 
provisions to be imported from other 
agreements.“ 
 
If this is the Commission’s intent, it has failed 
to achieve its goal in the Canada-EU CETA. 
The CETA text precludes the importation of 
procedural but not substantive provisions from 
other agreements. As a result, any steps by the 
Commission to clarify the scope and content of 
investment protection to preserve the right to 
regulate have been undermined by the treaty’s 
approach to MFN treatment. 
 
Even if the treaty precluded the importation of 
new standards from other treaties, this would 
not address the arbitrators’ use of MFN 
treatment to import more favourable 
descriptions of a standard from one treaty into 
another treaty that contains the same 
substantive provision. This approach to MFN 
jeopardizes the “modernizing” language 
promoted by the Commission in the 
consultation text, given that member states 
10 
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 have other treaties with language that is more 
open to abuse. 
 
In light of past adventurous interpretations, the 
MFN treatment standard should be excluded 
from the treaty or limited strictly to domestic 
regulatory treatment of foreign investors rather 
than any treatment in another treaty. 
 
 
PDF version, page 5: “The EU also includes 
exceptions allowing the Parties to take 
measures relating to the protection of health, 
the environment, consumers, etc. Additional 
carve-outs would apply to the audio-visual 
sector and the granting of subsidies. These are 
typically included in EU FTAs and also apply 
to the non-discrimination obligations relating 
to investment. Such exceptions allow 
differences in treatment between investors and 




Exceptions and carve-outs are an inherently 
limited way to preserve regulatory flexibility. 
First, they establish regulatory space as an 
exception to the principle of investment 
protection rather than an equal partner. Second, 
they typically do not extend to all standards of 
investment protection in the treaty, thus 
allowing arbitrators other ways to find a 
violation and award compensation. Third, they 
are usually limited to a particular sector or area 
of decision-making, thus exposing other 
sectors and areas to all of the threats that the 
exception was meant to safeguard against. 
 
Exceptions and carve-outs are not a substitute 
for a clear and unequivocal statement of the 




General response to Question 3: Fair and equitable treatment 
 
Question: [W]hat is your opinion of the approach to fair and equitable treatment of investors 
and their investments in relation to the TTIP? 
 
The Commission’s approach to fair and equitable treatment (FET) is extremely unfortunate and 
even duplicitous. The Commission claims to have provided for a closed list in the definition of 
the standard. Yet it has not adopted clear (and obvious) language to remove the arbitrators’ 
power to decide that the FET standard is not closed. The Commission also states its intent to 
preclude FET from being used as a stabilization clause. Yet this is not stated in the Canada-EU 
CETA although it would have been easy to do. 
 
In fact, while claiming that it wants to contain the arbitrators’ expansiveness, the Commission 
has expanded the scope of FET – relative to its widely-accepted customary meaning before the 
arbitrators arrived on the scene about 15 years ago. The Commission appears to have insisted 
that Canada move away from the NAFTA states’ well-established commitment to limiting FET 
11 
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to its customary meaning. Perhaps most troubling, the Commission has decided to allow the 
same arbitrators who wildly expanded the meaning of FET to keep control via ambiguous 
language in the Commissions’ definition.  
 
Specific response to Question 3: Fair and equitable treatment 
 
 






PDF version, page 5: “The obligation to grant 
foreign investors fair and equitable treatment 
(FET) is one of the key investment protection 
standards. It ensures that investors and 
investments are protected against treatment by 
the host country which, even if not 
expropriatory or discriminatory, is still 




The Commission avoids the troubling history 
of arbitrator awards. That history reveals FET 
as the most dangerous standard for taxpayers 
and regulators in that it has been used by 
tribunals more often than any other standard to 
find a treaty violation and compensate foreign 
investors. The vagueness of the standard has 
allowed the arbitrators to import a wide range 
of new concepts that expand the arbitrators’ 
power over legislatures, governments, and 
courts.5 
 
For example, the arbitrators invented or 
transplanted new and broadly-framed foreign 
investor rights to regulatory stability (putting a 
high price on democratic regulatory change), to 
be compensated for breach of their legitimate 
expectations of foreign investors (as measured 
by arbitrators), and to “good faith” in their 
dealings with government (another broad 
concept that no doubt all of us would love to 
receive). Which of these new concepts in the 
Commission’s view fall within its “etc.” in the 
consultation text? 
 
The Commission should acknowledge that 
FET has been abused by arbitrators under the 




5 See book. 
12 
 
                                                          
EU Public consultation on investor-state arbitration in TTIP – Comment – Gus Van Harten 
 
 
PDF version, page 5: “The FET standard is 
present in most international investment 
agreements. However, in many cases the 
standard is not defined, and it is usually not 
limited or clarified. Inevitably, this has given 
arbitral tribunals significant room for 
interpretation, and the interpretations adopted 
by arbitral tribunals have varied from very 
narrow to very broad, leading to much 
controversy about the precise meaning of the 
standard. This lack of clarity has fueled a large 
number of ISDS claims by investors, some of 
which have raised concern with regard to the 
states’ right to regulate. In particular, in some 
cases, the standard has been understood to 
encompass the protection of the legitimate 
expectations of investors in a very broad way, 




It is positive that the Commission 
acknowledges the history mentioned above 
although it still understates the extent of the 
arbitrators’ expansiveness. 
 
On the other hand, the Commission does not 
question the role of the arbitrators in causing 
the problem or the solution of replacing them 
with financially-disinterested judges. As well, 
the Commission does not propose to address 
other flaws in the process and structure of 




PDF version, page 5: “Certain investment 
agreements have narrowed down the content of 
the FET standard by linking it to concepts that 
are considered to be part of customary 
international law, such as the minimum 
standard of treatment that countries must 
respect in relation to the treatment accorded to 
foreigners. However, this has also resulted in a 
wide range of differing arbitral tribunal 
decisions on what is or is not covered by 
customary international law, and has not 
brought the desired greater clarity to the 
definition of the standard.” 
 
 
The Commission does not substantiate its 
claim in the second part of this paragraph. It is 
true that the attempt to link the FET standard to 
international custom was far from a complete 
success in containing the arbitrators. Yet the 
attempt did at least put potential limits on the 
meaning of FET as measured against the 
widely-understood customary meaning of the 
international minimum standard before the 
explosion of investor-state arbitration about 15 
years ago.  
 
 
PDF version, page 5: “An issue sometimes 
linked to the FET standard is the respect by the 
host country of its legal obligations towards the 
foreign investors and their investments 
(sometimes referred to as an “umbrella 
clause”), e.g. when the host country has 
entered into a contract with the foreign 
investor. Investment agreements may have 
specific provisions to this effect, which have 
 
This is a good example of how many 
arbitrators have used FET to expand their 
power and take investor protection well beyond 
its reasonable limits. I commend the 
Commission for identifying the problem. 
 
Unfortunately, as discussed below, the 
Commission has not addressed the problem. 
Indeed, in the Canada-EU CETA text, the 
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sometimes been interpreted broadly as 
implying that every breach of e.g. a contractual 
obligation could constitute a breach of the 
investment agreement.” 
 
Commission is apparently pushing (over 
Canada’s objections) a broad umbrella clause 
that runs along the lines of what the 
Commission laments here. This will invite 
more adventures by arbitrators. It suggests that 
the Commission is playing a double-game by 
reassuring the public while burying, in the 




PDF version, page 6: 
 
“The main objective of the EU is to clarify the 
standard, in particular by incorporating key 
lessons learned from case-law. This would 
eliminate uncertainty for both states and 
investors. 
 
Under this approach, a state could be held 
responsible for a breach of the fair and 
equitable treatment obligation only for 
breaches of a limited set of basic rights, 
namely: the denial of justice; the disregard of 
the fundamental principles of due process; 
manifest arbitrariness; targeted discrimination 
based on gender, race or religious belief; and 




If the intent is to clarify the standard, why 
leave the power to interpret a still-ambiguous 
text in the hands of those who took the 
standard too far? 
 
At best, the Commission is going half-way 
with the arbitrators. It is adopting some of their 
expansive interpretations – i.e. interpretations 
that have gone beyond the previously-accepted 
customary meaning – as “lessons learned from 
case law”. This most certainly will not 
“eliminate uncertainty” for states or investors. 
Rather, it rejects an alternative narrower and 
clearer meaning of FET.  
 
Indeed, the FET standard is arguably 
unnecessary alongside the other standards in 
investment treaties that protect foreign 
investors against uncompensated 
expropriation, discrimination, and failure to 
protect the investor’s physical security. I say 
“almost” because the only necessary role of 
FET in light of these other standards is to 
safeguard against denial of justice in the host 
country’s domestic courts. Denial of justice is 
easily defined in a treaty cover situations 
where a foreign investor suffers targeted 
discrimination or denial of due process. 
 
Added to the other standards of investor 
protection, FET goes well beyond “a limited 
set of basic rights”. It includes additional 
concepts which enhance arbitrator power 
dramatically to favour foreign investors. In 
essence, FET allows compensation without 
14 
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PDF version, page 6: “This list may be 
extended only where the Parties (the EU and 
the US) specifically agree to add such elements 
to the content of the standard, for instance 
where there is evidence that new elements of 




This statement is inaccurate. It would be easy 
to make clear that the relevant list is a closed 
list but the Canada-EU CETA does not do so. 
In that text, the relevant clause (Article 
X.X(2)) omits the word “only” when compared 
to the Commission’s consultation text. To 
make the list closed, as described in the 
consultation text, this Article would need to 
include the word “only” after “A Party 
breaches the obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment…” and before “where a measure or 
series of measures constitutes:…”. Or the 
Article would need to say, for example, that 
FET “includes and is limited to” the listed 
elements. 
 
These are basic points of legal drafting if the 
Commission wanted to ensure the list was 
closed to expansion by arbitrators. Instead, the 
clause’s ambiguity allows arbitrators to infer 
that the list was not intended by both states 
parties to be closed. Statements to the contrary 
in the consultation text are misleading. 
 
 
PDF version, page 6: “The “legitimate 
expectations” of the investor may be taken into 
account in the interpretation of the standard. 
However, this is possible only where clear, 
specific representations have been made by a 
Party to the agreement in order to convince the 
investor to make or maintain the investment 
and upon which the investor relied, and that 
were subsequently not respected by that Party. 
The intention is to make it clear that an 
investor cannot legitimately expect that the 




This aspect of FET was invented or 
transplanted by arbitrators in numerous past 
cases. By including it in the Canada-EU 
CETA, the Commission invites further 
arbitrator expansiveness. 
 
For example, must the state’s representations 
that create legitimate expectations be in 
writing? Presumably the answer is yes if the 
investor is to be compensated for relying on 
them. Yet this is not stated in the consultation 
text or the Canada-EU CETA. 
 
As a result, the Commission’s approach allows 
undocumented oral communications between 
an investor and a single official, on which there 
is no reliable written evidence, to create 
15 
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potentially massive public liability. This has 
occurred in past cases where legitimate 
expectations were found based on flimsy 
evidence.6 It is a recipe not only for 
misunderstanding but also possible fraud and 
corruption. 
 
It is reasonable to expect a foreign investor to 
wait for written confirmation before relying on 
a state’s representation. Any sophisticated 
adult, let alone major company, should know 
that promises should come in writing. 
 
The broad problem with the notion of 
legitimate expectations, backed by a right of 
retrospective public compensation for 
economic loss, is that it can frustrate or 
preclude legitimate regulatory change. 
 
 
PDF version, page 6: “Thus the EU intends to 
ensure that the standard is not understood to be 
a “stabilisation obligation”, in other words a 
guarantee that the legislation of the host state 




I find it hard not to read this statement as an 
attempt to mislead non-specialists. If this is the 
Commission’s intent, why is it not stated 
clearly and unequivocally in the treaty? It is 
not stated at all in the investment chapter of the 




6 Van Harten (2013) p gb on legitimate expectations being found on flimsy evidence. 
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PDF version, page 6: “In line with the general 
objective of clarifying the content of the 
standard, the EU shall also strive, where 
necessary, to provide protection to foreign 
investors in situations in which the host state 
uses its sovereign powers to avoid contractual 
obligations towards foreign investors or their 
investments, without however covering 
ordinary contractual breaches like the non-
payment of an invoice.” 
 
 
Here the Commission signals again that it 
wants to expand FET beyond its accepted 
customary meaning. 
 
By implication, the Commission is making the 
right to regulate less reliable than in the 
NAFTA context where Canada, the U.S., and 
Mexico have sought to check the arbitrators’ 
approach by requiring a link to international 
custom based on evidence of state practice and 
opinio juris. 
 
This indicates that the Commission wants to 
expand investment protection yet further at the 





General response to Question 4: Expropriation 
 
Question: [W]hat is your opinion of the approach to dealing with expropriation in relation to the 
TTIP? Please explain.  
 
Drawing on the post-2001 practice of the U.S. and Canada, the Commission has included useful 
language on indirect expropriation (see Canada-EU CETA, Article X (Annex)). However, as an 
attempt to protect the right to regulate, this approach is flawed because: (a) it does not apply to 
other standards in the treaty; (b) it contains qualifiers that allow the arbitrators to retain an 
unduly expansive approach; (c) it is open to a significant loophole due to the Commission’s 
approach to MFN treatment; and (d) it keeps power in the hands of arbitrators, instead of judges, 
who in many past awards have demonstrated themselves unsuited for ensuring a balanced 
approach to indirect expropriation and other concepts. 
 
The Commission’s reform on this issue thus falls well short of an effective safeguard for the 
right to regulate. 
 
Specific response to Question 4: Expropriation 
 
 






PDF version, page 6: “The right to property is 
a human right, enshrined in the European 
Convention of Human Rights, in the European 
 
The Commission’s reference to the right to 
property, enshrined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, is telling. The 
17 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as in 
the legal tradition of EU Member States. This 
right is crucial to investors and investments. 
Indeed, the greatest risk that investors may 
incur in a foreign country is the risk of having 
their investment expropriated without 
compensation. This is why the guarantees 
against expropriation are placed at the core of 
any international investment agreement.” 
 
relevant right is in Article 1 of Protocol 1 of 
the Convention. This Article has two parts, the 
second of which affirms the state’s right to 
regulate alongside the protection of property:  
 
“The preceding provisions [on property 
protection] shall not, however, in any 
way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary 
to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or 
to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.” 
 
Yet this aspect of the human right to property – 
or a similar affirmation of the right to regulate 
– is missing from the Canada-EU CETA and 
other European investment treaties. 
 
This reveals how treaties like CETA and TTIP 
revise the existing human rights framework 
and the balance between property rights and 
the state’s right to regulate (including to 
promote and protect other human rights). 
 
 
PDF version, page 7: “Direct expropriations, 
which entail the outright seizure of a property 
right, do not occur often nowadays and usually 
do not generate controversy in arbitral practice. 
However, arbitral tribunals are confronted with 
a much more difficult task when it comes to 
assessing whether a regulatory measure of a 
state, which does not entail the direct transfer 
of the property right, might be considered 




The question of what qualifies as indirect 
expropriation is critical in any legal system, 
that involves far-reaching power to decide 
when the state’s sovereign activity requires 
public compensation for an affected actor. 
 
The Commission understates the arbitrators’ 
record of expansiveness on this point. An 
example on this issue is the very broad 
statement by the early NAFTA tribunal in 
Metalclad which is one of the most frequently 
cited awards in investment treaty arbitration: 
 
“Thus, expropriation… includes… 
covert or incidental interference with 
the use of property which has the effect 
of depriving the owner, in whole or 
significant part, of the use or 
reasonably to be expected economic 
benefit of property even if not 
18 
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necessarily to the obvious benefit of the 
host State.”7 
 
This statement was characterized as extremely 
broad by a Canadian court: 
 
“The Tribunal gave an extremely broad 
definition of expropriation…. This 
definition is sufficiently broad to 
include a legitimate rezoning by a 
municipality or other zoning authority. 
However the definition of expropriation 
is a question of law with which this 
Court is not entitled to interfere….”8 
 
However, the reviewing court in Metalclad 
could not interfere with the tribunal’s approach 
due to the limited role of judicial review in 
investment treaty arbitration (in Metalclad, 
limited judicial review took place under the 
UNCITRAL Rules and related implementing 
legislation in Canada; the ICSID Rules do not 
allow for any judicial supervision of awards 




PDF version, page 7: “Indirect expropriation 
has been a source of concern in certain cases 
where regulatory measures taken for legitimate 
purposes have been subject to investor claims 
for compensation, on the grounds that such 
measures were equivalent to expropriation 
because of their significant negative impact on 
investment. Most investment agreements do 
not provide details or guidance in this respect, 
which has inevitably left arbitral tribunals with 
significant room for interpretation.” 
 
 
The Commission mentions the unsurprising 
tendency of foreign investors to support an 
expansive approach to indirect expropriation. 
However, the Commission does not mention 
the arbitrators’ expansive record on this point. 
 
With a research assistant, I coded all awards in 
known cases to May-June 2010 to assess 
whether the arbitrators took an expansive 
approach to the concept of indirect 
expropriation (a) by focusing exclusively or 
primarily on the effect of a state decision on 
the investor and putting aside other relevant 
factors such as the purpose of a non-
discriminatory general measure, (b) by finding 
an expropriation where there was merely a 
“significant” or “substantial” effect on the 
7 Metalclad v Mexico (Award of 30 August 2000, NAFTA) para 103.  
8 United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation, 2001 BCSC 664 (2 May 2001) para 99. 
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investor, or (c) by severing the investor’s 
economic interest into segments thus elevating 
the degree of impact of the measure. 
 
We found that in 72.5% of 120 resolutions (per 
arbitrator) of this issue as either expansive or 
restrictive, the arbitrators took an expansive 
approach. Thus, the usual approach was to 
resolve the ambiguity in favour of a less 
reliable right to regulate. This tendency toward 
expansiveness was observed in general across 
14 jurisdictional and substantive issues.9  
 
 
PDF version, page 7: “The objective of the EU 
is to clarify the provisions on expropriation and 
to provide interpretative guidance with regard 
to indirect expropriation in order to avoid 
claims against legitimate public policy 
measures. The EU wants to make it clear that 
non-discriminatory measures taken for 
legitimate public purposes, such as to protect 
health or the environment, cannot be 
considered equivalent to an expropriation, 
unless they are manifestly excessive in light of 
their purpose. The EU also wants to clarify that 
the simple fact that a measure has an impact on 
the economic value of the investment does not 




The Commission again leaves the keys with 
those who crashed the car. Besides clarifying 
the text, arbitrators need to be replaced with 
financially-disinterested judges. Otherwise, the 
resolution of the inevitable trade-offs between 
investment protection and the right to regulate 
is stacked in favour of the former. 
 
In addition, the Commission’s textual 
clarifications on indirect expropriation have 
important limitations. First, they are vulnerable 
to the MFN loophole, outlined above, because 
virtually all European states have treaties with 
third-states that do not contain the limiting 
language on indirect expropriation. To address 
this, the Commission would need to remove 
MFN treatment from the treaty or state clearly 
and unequivocally that MFN treatment is 
limited to domestic regulatory treatment of 
investors and does not extend to treatment in 
another treaty. 
 
Second, the clarifying language on indirect 
expropriation has qualifiers that allow 
arbitrators to continue their expansive 
approach. 
 
Third, to be effective, the clarifications on 
indirect expropriation would need to apply to 
all standards in the treaty. Otherwise, a tribunal 
9 Van Harten (2012) gb; Van Harten (2013) gb. 
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can avoid the language by finding a violation 
of another standard (most likely FET). In one 
past case, an arbitrator said in his reasons that 
the tribunal should find a violation of FET 
instead of indirect expropriation because this 
allowed the tribunal to reach the same outcome 




General response to Question 5: Ensuring the right to regulate and investment protection 
 
Question: [W]hat is your opinion with regard to the way the right to regulate is dealt with in the 
EU's approach to TTIP? 
 
The Commission does not mention the contradiction between investor-state arbitration and 
human rights protection. In turn, its approach to investor-state arbitration endorses an elevation 
of property rights over both the right to regulate and other human rights. 
 
In the CETA text, the right to regulate has not been affirmed clearly and unequivocally (it 
appears not to be mentioned in the investment chapter). For a meaningful balance between 
investment protection and the right to regulate – including to promote and protect human rights – 
the treaty would require a clear and unqualified affirmation of the right alongside the many 
elaborate rights for investors and responsibilities for states. The Commission’s only “procedural 
improvement” on the right to regulate actually intensifies the pressure on states to change their 
decisions in order to appease arbitrator power and avoid financial liability. 
 
The Commission continues to give for-profit arbitrators, who have an exceptional financial 
interest to favour prospective claimants (i.e. foreign investors, especially deep-pocketed 
companies), the power to interpret and apply virtually all treaty provisions. States cannot initiate 
claims under the Canada-EU CETA or other investment treaties and are for this reason not the 
“customers” of the arbitration industry. As discussed above, the Commission downplays the role 
of arbitrator power and its control over public money by inflating the usefulness of its textual 
clarifications. 
 
The Commission should acknowledge that arbitrator decisions are “only as good” as the process 
by which arbitrators are appointed and make their decisions. The lack of institutional 
independence and procedural fairness in investor-state arbitration – which the Commission 
leaves untouched – means that all outcomes of investor-state arbitration under the CETA or TTIP 
would lack integrity regardless of the underlying text. 
10 SD Myers v Canada (Schwartz separate opinion, 12 November 2000) para. 222 (where the arbitrator 
commented that the tribunal should find a violation of the NAFTA minimum standard, instead of the 
NAFTA expropriation standard, because ‘it makes no practical difference to [the claimant] whether the 
expropriation label is attached’ and ‘seems unlikely that the measure of damages would be any greater’; 
on the other hand, ‘a finding of expropriation might contribute to public misunderstanding and anxiety 
about both this decision and the wider implications of the investment chapter of NAFTA’). 
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Specific response to Question 5: Ensuring the right to regulate and investment protection 
 
 






PDF version, page 7-8: “In democratic 
societies, the right to regulate of states is 
subject to principles and rules contained in 
both domestic legislation and in international 
law. For instance, in the European Convention 
on Human Rights, the Contracting States 
commit themselves to guarantee a number of 
civil and political rights. In the EU, the 
Constitutions of the Member States, as well as 
EU law, ensure that the actions of the state 
cannot go against fundamental rights of the 
citizens. Hence, public regulation must be 
based on a legitimate purpose and be necessary 
in a democratic society.” 
 
 
There are two major problems with this 
statement. First, there is a stark contrast 
between the Commission’s handling of the 
right to regulate in the Canada-EU CETA and 
the handling of property rights and the right to 
regulate in the European Convention of Human 
Rights, as noted under Question 4 above. 
 
Second, investor-state arbitration contradicts a 
basic principle of human rights in democratic 
societies: one actor should not be discriminated 
against inappropriately to favour another. By 
definition, investor-state arbitration 
discriminates in favour of foreign asset owners 
and against other persons whose rights may be 
affected by state decisions (including decisions 
concerning the regulation and conduct of 
foreign investors). Unlike foreign investors, all 
other rights-holders are limited to human rights 
adjudication in domestic and regional 
institutions to protect their property and other 
rights. Indeed, the presumption of the CETA is 
that these other institutions are so inadequate – 
albeit for foreign investors only – that even the 
usual duty to exhaust reasonable-available 
domestic remedies should never apply! 
 
This creates major advantages for foreign 
investors. Their special access to investor-state 
arbitration allows them, among other things, 
(a) much more widely enforceable awards than 
in human rights adjudication; (b) the potential 
for vastly more public compensation – to date, 
billions of dollars – than in human rights 
adjudication; (c) the ability to call on standards 
of protection that are not balanced by 
countervailing features of human rights 
adjudication including a clear statement of the 
state’s right to regulate or of the need to 
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balance investment protection against human 
rights; (d) the power, unlike human rights 
complainants, to play a direct role in the make-
up of the tribunal; and (e) a decision-making 
process in which the adjudicator has an 
apparent interest to favour claimants (i.e. 
foreign investors, especially deep-pocketed 
companies), assuming that arbitrators who 
want to be re-appointed may encourage claims 
in order to support the arbitration industry. 
 
The Commission does not acknowledge this 
basic conflict between investor-state arbitration 
and human rights. Instead, it accepts 
unjustified discrimination in favour of foreign 
investors by granting them special substantive 
and procedural rights and by giving arbitrators 
the power to put investor rights and interests 
ahead of those of other actors and ahead of the 
public interest.  
 
An example illustrates the problem. In the era 
of investor-state arbitration, if a foreign 
national were tortured by state officials, he or 
she would be able to bring an international 
claim against the state – without having to 
resort first to domestic courts, where 
reasonably-available – only if he or she owned 
assets in the state and only to the extent that 
the torture affected his or her position as an 
asset owner. 
 
On the other hand, if a foreign investor’s 
officials were to torture their domestic 
employees with the collaboration of the state, 
the employees could not bring an international 
claim against the company or its officers, and 
could bring a claim against the state for failing 
to protect them only after resorting first to 
domestic remedies. This is an absurd elevation 
in law of foreign investors over everyone else. 




PDF version, page 8: “Investment agreements 
 
Instead of acknowledging the contradiction 
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reflect this perspective. Nevertheless, wherever 
such agreements contain provisions that appear 
to be very broad or ambiguous, there is always 
a risk that the arbitral tribunals interpret them 
in a manner which may be perceived as a threat 
to the state's right to regulate. In the end, the 
decisions of arbitral tribunals are only as good 
as the provisions that they have to interpret and 
apply.” 
 
between investor-state arbitration and human 
rights, the Commission returns to the weak 
option of textual clarifications. In the last 
sentence of this statement, the Commission 
downplays the past role of the arbitrators in 
exploiting treaty ambiguity to expand their 
power and undermine the right to regulate. The 
Commission’s textual clarifications always 
leave behind a degree of ambiguity. 
 
A more accurate statement would be that the 
arbitrators’ decisions are “only as good” as the 
process by which they are appointed and make 
decisions. The lack of institutionalized 
independence and procedural fairness in 
investor-state arbitration means that all 
outcomes of investor-state arbitration lack 




PDF version, page 8: 
 
“The objective of the EU is to achieve a solid 
balance between the protection of investors and 
the Parties’ right to regulate.  
 
First of all, the EU wants to make sure that the 
Parties’ right to regulate is confirmed as a basic 
underlying principle. This is important, as 
arbitral tribunals will have to take this principle 




As discussed above, the Commission does not 
affirm, clearly and unequivocally, the right to 
regulate. As a result, the Commission has not 
balanced that right with the elaborate rights of 
foreign investors and the corresponding 
responsibilities of states. 
 
It is not enough for the Commission to declare 
its intent to balance or confirm the right to 
regulate in a consultation text, in the treaty’s 
preamble, or in a substantive provision that has 
major qualifications such as a circular clause 
providing that the right to regulate is protected 
so long as it is exercised consistently with the 
treaty. Indeed, mention of the right to regulate 
in these contexts is harmful because it supports 
an inference that the states parties intended not 
to make the right to regulate clearly applicable 




PDF version, page 8: “Secondly, the EU will 
introduce clear and innovative provisions with 
regard to investment protection standards that 
 
This is not credible. The FET and indirect 
expropriation provisions in the Canada-EU 
CETA were discussed under Questions 3 and 4 
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have raised concern in the past (for instance, 
the standard of fair and equitable treatment is 
defined based on a closed list of basic rights; 
the annex on expropriation clarifies that non-
discriminatory measures for legitimate public 
policy objectives do not constitute indirect 
expropriation). These improvements will 
ensure that investment protection standards 
cannot be interpreted by arbitral tribunals in a 
way that is detrimental to the right to regulate.” 
 
above. To reiterate, they are vulnerable to the 
MFN loophole, have unacceptable qualifiers, 
are broader (in the case of FET) than 
comparable standards in other treaties 
including NAFTA, and are left to the 
discretion of arbitrators instead of judges. 
There is no way to “ensure” that the treaty 
“cannot be interpreted” by anyone in a way 
that harms the right to regulate. However, the 
Commission could at least remove the 
unacceptable financial interests of the 
adjudicator in this respect. 
 
 
PDF version, page 8-9: “Third, the EU will 
ensure that all the necessary safeguards and 
exceptions are in place. For instance, foreign 
investors should be able to establish in the EU 
only under the terms and conditions defined by 
the EU. A list of horizontal exceptions will 
apply to non-discrimination obligations, in 
relation to measures such as those taken in the 
field of environmental protection, consumer 
protection or health (see question 2 for details). 
Additional carve-outs would apply to the 
audiovisual sector and the granting of 
subsidies. Decisions on competition matters 
will not be subject to investor-to-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS). Furthermore, in line with 
other EU agreements, nothing in the agreement 
would prevent a Party from taking measures 
for prudential reasons, including measures for 
the protection of depositors or measures to 
ensure the integrity and stability of its financial 
system. In addition, EU agreements contain 
general exceptions applying in situations of 
crisis, such as in circumstances of serious 
difficulties for the operation of the exchange 
rate policy or monetary policy, balance of 




The reliance on exceptions and carve-outs to 
safeguard the right to regulate gives that right 
an inferior legal status to foreign investors’ 
rights and protections.  The general principle of 
the treaty is one of investment protection 
unless the state can make an exceptional case 
for the right to regulate. This is prioritizing not 
balancing. 
 
Exceptions or reservations also have other 
limitations. Usually they apply only to some 
substantive provisions in the treaty or only to 
particular sectors or areas of decision-making. 
For example, why do “competition matters” 
but not, for example, public health matters call 
for exemption from investor-state arbitration? 
Put differently, why does investor-state 
arbitration present an unacceptable threat to the 
right to regulate in competition but not in other 
areas of regulation? 
 
 
PDF version, page 9: “In terms of the 
procedural aspects relating to ISDS, the 
objective of the EU is to build a system 
 
An express mechanism for agreed 
interpretations by the states parties is not new. 
It has been part of NAFTA for 20 years. In that 
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capable of adapting to the states' right to 
regulate. Wherever greater clarity and 
precision proves necessary in order to protect 
the right to regulate, the Parties will have the 
possibility to adopt interpretations of the 
investment protection provisions which will be 
binding on arbitral tribunals. This will allow 
the Parties to oversee how the agreement is 
interpreted in practice and, where necessary, to 
influence the interpretation.” 
 
context, the mechanism has been used twice, 
and only once to reign in expansive approaches 
to a substantive standard. Further, the option to 
issue subsequent agreements about the 
meaning of a treaty is available generally to all 
states as a matter of treaty law. To my 
knowledge, outside NAFTA, it never been 
used successfully in investor-state arbitration. 
 
Overall, this mechanism of shared 
interpretation is a rarely-used and bureaucratic 
process that requires the consent of all states 
parties. In the cat-and-mouse game between 
states and arbitrators, it is a lumbering way to 
react to arbitrator frolics. For-profit arbitrators 
should not have the power to interpret the 




PDF version, page 9: “The procedural 
improvements proposed by the EU will also 
make it clear that an arbitral tribunal will not 
be able to order the repeal of a measure, but 
only compensation for the investor.” 
 
 
This is not new and should not be described as 
a “procedural improvement”. 
 
In investor-state arbitration, the primary 
remedy is monetary compensation; i.e., a 
backward-looking damages award to the 
investor. This distinguishes investor-state 
arbitration from courts, where the primary 
remedy for unlawful sovereign conduct is 
usually non-monetary (partly to protect the 
fiscal powers of legislative and executive 
actors). It also distinguishes investor-state 
arbitration from the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) where, if a state is found to have 
violated the agreement, the state has an 
opportunity to correct the illegality before 
facing an economic remedy. 
 
Thus, the Commission’s approach avoids the 
key problem that, in the face of uncertain but 
potentially costly liability, states may pull back 
from important decisions when threatened with 
an investor-state claim, especially if the 
investor is a deep-pocketed company and large 
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The Commission’s main innovation in this 
context of regulatory chill (sometimes called 
“good governance”), is to instruct tribunals 
when calculating damages to take into account 
“any repeal or modification” of the state’s 
original decision (see CETA Article x-36(3), 
which the Commission did not include among 
the CETA excerpts in its consultation text). 
 
I have not seen a clause like this before in an 
investment treaty. In effect, it institutionalizes 
the pressure for a state to change its decisions 
in favour of foreign investors. Thus, it expands 
the advantages given to foreign investors in 
their relations with the state relative to anyone 





Response to the Commission’s Introduction to Questions 6 to 12 (investor-to-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS)) 
 
Throughout this comment, I refer to “investor-state arbitration” or “investment treaty arbitration” 
instead of “investor-state dispute settlement”. This is because the latter term downplays the key 
role of arbitration – in contrast to mediation or negotiation/ settlement under threat of arbitration 
– as the key compulsory and binding element of investment treaties. 
 
 






PDF version, page 9: “Investor-to-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) is a legal instrument that 
allows investors to bring a claim before an 
arbitration tribunal that the host state has not 
respected the investment protection rules under 
TTIP. Domestic remedies would be preferable, 
but TTIP provisions cannot be invoked directly 
in front of a national court.” 
 
 
This is a dubious justification for investor-state 
arbitration. In many countries, treaties in 
general are often not directly applicable in 
domestic law. Yet this does not support the use 
of investor-state arbitration, to protect foreign 
investors alone, in situations where (a) 
domestic law nonetheless ensures sufficient 
protection and (b) domestic courts offer justice 




PDF version, page 9: “Despite the general 
solidity of developed court systems such as the 
 
If the concern is that a foreign investor may 
sometimes not have effective access to justice 
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US and the EU, it is possible that investors will 
not be given effective access to justice, e.g. if 
they are denied access to appeal or due 
process, leaving them without any effective 
legal remedy. ISDS is therefore necessary to 
allow legitimate claims to be pursued. In such 
cases, the investors would have to prove that 
the measures have breached the investment 
protection provisions and that it caused them 
damage.” 
 
in the U.S. or EU, the solution is to allow an 
international claim only in such cases. Yet the 
Commission plans to allow investor-state 
arbitration without any obligation at all for a 
foreign investor to resort to reasonably-
available domestic remedies. 
 
In effect, this implies that domestic courts do 
not offer effective access to justice in all cases, 
everywhere, in the U.S. and EU. It is ridiculous 
to claim that this is so in the absence of any 
systematic evidence that domestic courts in the 




PDF version, page 9: “The possibility for 
investors to resort to ISDS is a standard feature 
of virtually all the 3000 investment agreements 
in existence today, including the 1400 signed 
by EU Member States. Most of these 
agreements contain a standard paragraph 
stating that investors can to go to ISDS in case 




Proponents of investor-state arbitration often 
refer to the figure of about 3000 existing 
treaties that provide for investor-state 
arbitration to support the case for more such 
treaties. 
 
First, the figure is not as large as it seems. To 
match the legal effect of a multilateral 
agreement on investment, for example, one 
would need over 19,000 bilateral investment 
treaties (196 countries * 195 countries / 2). On 
this measure, 3000 treaties is about 16% of 
potential coverage. 
 
Second, most existing treaties do not govern 
significant investment flows and appear 
unlikely to lead to claims. Over half of known 
cases (129 of 249) to May-June 2010 arose 
under NAFTA, the Energy Charter Treaty, and 
just 15 bilateral investment treaties of the 
U.S.11 
 
Third, investor-state arbitration based on 
existing treaties (not including potential forum-
shopping via shell companies) covers only a 
11 This includes 61 cases under NAFTA, 24 cases under the Energy Charter Treaty, and 44 cases under 
U.S. BITs with Argentina, Zaire, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Romania, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, and Ukraine. The dataset 
consisted of all 249 known cases that had led to a publicly-available award on jurisdiction (or, for 
NAFTA cases, a notice of intent to arbitrate) as of cut-offs during May-June 2010. 
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minority of international FDI flows. For 
example, investment-state arbitration covered 
15-20% of inward and outward FDI flows for 
the U.S. in 2012. The TTIP would cover an 
additional 50-60% of those FDI flows.12 
 
A few treaties now pursued by the Commission 
or the U.S. – the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
EU-China, and U.S.-China – would expand 
coverage of investor-state arbitration 
dramatically (to over 80% of international FDI 
flows based on U.S. flows as a proxy). Thus, 
one or two new treaties, especially TTIP, 
would expand arbitrator power by far more 
than all existing treaties combined. 
 
Overall, it lacks credibility to justify a major 
new treaty providing for investor-state 
arbitration – especially in the relatively 
untouched domain of investment relations 
among developed countries – by referring to 




PDF version, page 9-10: “The agreements 
themselves do not contain any precise 
procedural framework for how an ISDS case 
should be handled by a tribunal. The ISDS 
tribunal must work on the basis of international 
arbitration rules that set a general procedural 
framework. The most common are the rules of 
the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”, a World Bank 
body) or those of the United Nations 
Commission for International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”). However, these rules only 
partially address the problems which have 
come to light over the last years with the ISDS 
 
This is an incomplete statement of the 
procedural and institutional problems that 
follow from the use of for-profit arbitration to 
resolve, on a final basis, some of the most 
profound questions of public law and public 
policy. The statement does not mention (a) the 
lack of institutional safeguards of judicial 
independence in investor-state arbitration, (b) 
the lack of procedural fairness due to the 
selective and arbitrary approach to full 
standing rights, (c) the inappropriate role of 
retrospective public compensation as a remedy, 
and (d) the essential imbalance both between 
investor rights and investor responsibilities (the 
12 These approximate figures were calculated based on existing investment treaty coverage of country-by-
country inward and outward FDI flows for the U.S. in 2012 from the data provided in Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “StatExtracts: FDI flows by partner country”, 
available online: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER. The figures do 
not account for the possibility of forum-shopping by foreign investors which is difficult to measure, and 
handled in different ways by arbitrators and existing treaties, but may expand existing coverage of 
investor-state arbitration by a significant proportion. 
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system, notably on transparency, the conduct 
of arbitrators and the absence of any appeal 
mechanism.” 
 
treaties institute the former not the latter) and 
between state rights and state responsibilities 
(the treaties institute the latter not the former). 
 
 
PDF version, page 10: “The EU is working to 
develop an efficient and modern ISDS 
mechanism which is equipped to deal with 
these problems. The EU will improve the ISDS 
mechanism under TTIP compared to existing 
investment agreements. The improvements are 
explained in the questions that follow where 
we ask you to comment and make suggestions. 
Through these improvements, the EU aims to 
ensure a transparent, accountable and well-
functioning ISDS system that reflects the 
public interest and policy objectives.” 
 
 
The “improvements” discussed by the 
Commission – other than on transparency – are 
minor and sometimes detrimental, as I discuss 
below. 
 
In its last sentence, the Commission does not 
refer to the fundamental adjudicative values of 
independence, including at an institutional 
level, and procedural fairness. The failure to 
discuss these values helps the Commission to 
sidestep the importance of replacing arbitrators 
with judges and of allowing all parties whose 
rights or interests are affected to have full 
standing in the adjudicative process.  
 
 
PDF version, page 10: “The EU will 
encourage the amicable settlement of disputes, 
through a required period for consultations, 
and the possibility of mediation.” 
 
 
As discussed below, the settlement of an 
investor-state dispute, whether or not based on 
formal mediation, lacks integrity where a party 
agrees to settlement under the threat of an 
arbitration process that itself lacks integrity. 
Investor-state arbitration lacks integrity 
because it is not institutionally independent, 
procedurally fair, open to the public, and 




PDF version, page 10: “The EU also aims to 
enhance consistency of rulings, including by 
the establishment of an appeal mechanism and 
by allowing for the governments to provide 
guidance and interpretation so that their 
intentions are respected. A further 
consideration is how to avoid frivolous or 
unfounded claims; the EU will introduce 
mechanisms to allow for a quick dismissal of 
such claims. Transparency and the possibility 
for stakeholders to make their views heard in 
the process underpin these improvements and 
are essential for an accountable and credible 
 
Other than for transparency, none of the 
Commission’s reforms would make a 
meaningful difference to the lack of 
independence, fairness, and balance in 
investor-state arbitration. On transparency, the 











General response to Question 6: Transparency in ISDS 
 
Question: [P]lease provide your views on whether [the Commission’s] approach contributes to 
the objective of the EU to increase transparency and openness in the ISDS system for TTIP. 
Please indicate any additional suggestions you may have. 
 
The Commission’s approach to transparency is positive. Some Western European countries have 
been opponents of transparency in investor-state arbitration for reasons that seemed hypocritical 
and short-sighted. It is positive that the European Commission has chosen to defend the principle 
of openness in adjudication where the adjudication affects interests of third parties and the 
public. 
 
To elaborate, in investor-state arbitration, the arbitrators have the power to decide finally what a 
sovereign may do lawfully in its legislative, executive, or judicial role and, in turn, what should 
happen where the sovereign is found to have acted unlawfully. These are among the highest 
powers of any adjudicator. Clearly, they should be a matter of public record for reasons of 
accountability, independence, and fairness. 
 
On the other hand, there are limitations to the Commission’s process to ensure transparency. 
Most importantly, it leaves to arbitrators not judges the decision whether documents or hearings 
should be public. This is a problem because, among other things, all arbitrators may view 
claimants – i.e. foreign investors, especially deep-pocketed companies – at some level as their 
customers and because claimants may oppose public access for self-serving reasons.  
 
The Commission alludes briefly to, but does not address, the lack of procedural fairness in 
investment treaty arbitration. The lack of fairness arises most clearly because anyone – other 
than the claimant investor and respondent national government – whose rights or interests are 
affected by the adjudication is not permitted to have full standing in the process. The 
Commission’s reference to an ability for civil society actors to “file submissions” at the 
discretion of the arbitrators is clearly insufficient to address this concern. 
 
Specific response to Question 6: Transparency in ISDS 
 
 






PDF version, page 10: 
 
“In most ISDS cases, no or little information is 
made available to the public, hearings are not 
open and third parties are not allowed to 
 
This is a very good statement of the current 
inadequacies and essential role of transparency 
in investor-state arbitration. Yet it also 
highlights the problem that, even when an 
investment treaty award must be made public, 
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intervene in the proceedings. This makes it 
difficult for the public to know the basic facts 
and to evaluate the claims being brought by 
either side.  
 
This lack of openness has given rise to concern 
and confusion with regard to the causes and 
potential outcomes of ISDS disputes. 
Transparency is essential to ensure the 
legitimacy and accountability of the system. It 
enables stakeholders interested in a dispute to 
be informed and contribute to the proceedings. 
It fosters accountability in arbitrators, as their 
decisions are open to scrutiny. It contributes to 
consistency and predictability as it helps create 
a body of cases and information that can be 
relied on by investors, stakeholders, states and 
ISDS tribunals. 
 
Under the rules that apply in most existing 
agreements, both the responding state and the 
investor need to agree to permit the publication 
of submissions. If either the investor or the 
responding state does not agree to publication, 
documents cannot be made public. As a result, 
most ISDS cases take place behind closed 
doors and no or a limited number of documents 
are made available to the public.” 
 
it is possible for claims to be brought, tribunals 
established, and settlements reached (entailing 
payment of public money and regulatory chill) 
without public knowledge. 
 
Despite its positive approach on transparency, 
the Commission does not address this problem. 
The Commission should make clear in the 
treaty that the fact and terms of any settlement 
reached by a state, following the invocation of 
the treaty by a foreign investor in any verbal or 
written communications with the government, 
will be public. The Commission should also 
ensure that all documents, including evidence 
submitted to the tribunal, will be public. 
 
Vitally, any non-disclosure of documents or 
closure of hearings should be permitted only 
after a judicial process. 
 
 
PDF version, page 11: “The EU's aim is to 
ensure transparency and openness in the ISDS 
system under TTIP. The EU will include 
provisions to guarantee that hearings are open 
and that all documents are available to the 
public. In ISDS cases brought under TTIP, all 
documents will be publicly available (subject 
only to the protection of confidential 
information and business secrets) and hearings 
will be open to the public.” 
 
 
In essence, the Commission has adopted the 
transparency reforms of the NAFTA states 
after early NAFTA tribunals did not permit 
openness in the face of ambiguous treaty 
language on this point. 
 
That said, there are limitations to the 
Commission’s approach. Most importantly, it 
still allows arbitrators instead of judges to 
decide whether to allow documents and 
hearings to be public. This is a problem among 
other things because, in a one-way system of 
arbitration, all the arbitrators may at some level 
view claimants as their “customers” and 
because claimants have sometimes opposed 
public access to documents or hearings for 
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Lastly, the Commission needs to make clear 
the presumption that all evidence submitted to 
the arbitrators is public. 
 
 
PDF version, page 11: Interested parties from 
civil society will be able to file submissions to 




This reform falls well short of ensuring 
procedural fairness in the arbitration. 
 
There are many reasons why investor-state 
arbitration may be said to be unfair. The most 
precise one is that the system denies parties 
whose rights or interests (including 
reputational interests) are affected by the 
adjudication – such as a local government 
alleged to have done wrong or a private party 
alleged to be corrupt – the right to full standing 
in the process so that their evidence and 
arguments can be heard. 
 
The Commission’s statement refers to a 
mechanism by which parties other than the 
claimant investor and respondent government 
will be able, at the arbitrators’ discretion, to 
apply for a limited right “to file submissions” 
to a tribunal. This does not address the lack of 
procedural fairness in the system. For a fair 
process, any party whose rights or interests are 
affected by the adjudication must have a right 




PDF version, page 11: “The EU took a leading 
role in establishing new United Nations rules 
on transparency in ISDS. The objective of 
transparency will be achieved by incorporating 
these rules into TTIP.” 
 
 
As an aside, the new UNCITRAL rules on 
transparency unfortunately apply only to 
claims under treaties that were concluded after 
the UNCITRAL transparency rules came into 
effect. This approach differs from other 
amendments to arbitration rules, such as the 
ICC Rules, which after their amendment 
applied presumptively to all new claims under 
existing treaties, contracts, or other instruments 
that allowed for claims under the ICC Rules. 
The same principle should have applied to the 
new UNCITRAL transparency rules. 
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My understanding is that members of the 
arbitration industry played a role in promoting 
this unfortunate outcome, including while 
acting as representatives of governments at 
relevant UNCITRAL meetings. In light of this 
history, I suggest that European institutions 
should commit to making public any internal 
or external lobbying role played by members 
of the arbitration industry in the Commission’s 




General response to Question 7: Multiple claims and relationship to domestic courts 
 
Question: Please provide your views on the effectiveness of [the Commission’s] approach for 
balancing access to ISDS with possible recourse to domestic courts and for avoiding conflicts 
between domestic remedies and ISDS in relation to the TTIP. Please indicate any further steps 
that can be taken. Please provide comments on the usefulness of mediation as a means to settle 
disputes.  
 
The Commission has not taken obvious steps to “favour” domestic courts despite its statement to 
the contrary in the consultation text. The Commission’s approach also does not address the 
widespread issue of investor-state arbitrators refusing to stay their proceedings in the face of a 
parallel proceeding in domestic courts, another international forum, or a contractually-agreed 
forum. This leads to waste of resources on parallel litigation and to conflicting decisions. It also 
contradicts principles of party autonomy, sanctity of contract and the avoidance of parallel 
proceedings. 
 
The Commission could easily address the concern. It could require foreign investors, before an 
international claim can be brought, to exhaust remedies in domestic courts where they offer 
justice and are reasonably-available. It could direct investment treaty arbitrators to stay their 
proceedings where a parallel claim has been or could be brought in a contractually-agreed forum 
or another international forum, where the dispute is factually connected to the other forum, and 
where the foreign investor or a closely related party is or could be a claimant in the other forum. 
The Commission could also address the arbitrators’ creative interpretations that have facilitated 
parallel treaty proceedings in factually-similar disputes.13 Lastly, the Commission could replace 
the arbitrators with judges in order to remove the adjudicator’s financial interest in allowing 
parallel treaty claims.  
 
Mediation under investment treaties takes place under the threat of investor-state arbitration. 
That is, the state’s agreement to mediate is premised on the threat or fact of an arbitration claim. 
In turn, the lack of independence and fairness in investor-state arbitration taints the integrity of a 
13 Van Harten (2013) p gb – creative interpretations. 
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mediation or settlement in the shadow of investor-state arbitration. For these reasons, mediation 
and settlements in this context are not “useful”, other than for those who already benefit from 
investor-state arbitration. 
 
Specific response to Question 7: Multiple claims and relationship to domestic courts 
 
 






PDF version, page 11: “Investors who 
consider that they have grounds to complain 
about action taken by the authorities (e.g. 
discrimination or lack of compensation after 
expropriation) often have different options. 
They may be able to go to domestic courts and 
seek redress there. They or any related 
companies may be able to go to other 




Arbitrators commonly allow treaty claims by 
foreign investors that run parallel to other 
forums including domestic courts, treaty-based 
forms, and contractually-agreed forums. 
 
The Commission has done virtually nothing to 
address this problem. As a result, it has left in 
place the risk of wasteful litigation and 
conflicting decisions. The Commission has 
also endorsed the arbitrators’ rejection of 
important principles such as party autonomy, 




PDF version, page 11: “It is often the case that 
protection offered in investment agreements 
cannot be invoked before domestic courts and 
the applicable legal rules are different. For 
example, discrimination in favour of local 
companies is not prohibited under US law but 
is prohibited in investment agreements. There 
are also concerns that, in some cases domestic 
courts may favour the local government over 
the foreign investor e.g. when assessing a 
claim for compensation for expropriation or 
may deny due process rights such as the 
effective possibility to appeal. Governments 
may have immunity from being sued.” 
 
 
This is a weak argument for investor-state 
arbitration in the absence of a duty to exhaust 
domestic remedies. 
 
For one, investment-state arbitration is not 
justified by the general fact that in many 
countries a treaty cannot be invoked directly 
before domestic courts (without implementing 
legislation to incorporate the treaty into 
domestic law) or that legal rules differ between 
domestic law and treaty law or among 
domestic legal systems. These are basic 
characteristics of the existence of states and the 
distinction between the domestic and 
international legal spheres. They do not 
themselves justify giving a foreign investor the 
special right to bring international claims 
without going first to domestic courts, where 
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Subject to the duty to exhaust local remedies, a 
foreign investor anywhere – who has suffered 
from inappropriate discrimination, 
expropriation without compensation, an unfair 
process, or an inability to enforce a judicial 
order (and who did not receive full protection 
in domestic courts) – could bring a treaty claim 
based on denial of justice. Put differently, all 
of the concerns identified by the Commission 
can be addressed without assuming that 
domestic courts everywhere are systematically 
unable to protect foreign investors. 
 
The Commission offers no evidence or 
rationale to support allowing foreign investors 
to avoid domestic courts in all situations. 
Investor-state arbitration is an over-reaction – 
putting it mildly – to general concerns that 
arise in all countries for everyone from the 
inapplicability of international rules or 
inevitable differences in domestic legal rules. 
 
 
PDF version, page 11: “In addition, the 
remedies are often different. In some cases 
government measures can be reversed by 
domestic courts, for example if they are illegal 
or unconstitutional. ISDS tribunals cannot 
order governments to reverse measures.” 
 
 
As discussed under Question 5 above, this 
statement highlights how the primary remedy 
in investor-state arbitration – a retrospective 
award for potentially vast amounts of public 
money– creates problems for the right to 
regulate. For good reason, domestic and 
international courts are cautious about 
awarding large amounts of monetary 
compensation for past decisions of a 
legislature, government, or court that are later 
found to be unlawful. 
 
For example, the Commission and European 
member states expressed this concern in ECJ 
proceedings on a related issue of state liability 
in European Community law:14 
 
“If questions of interpretation are 
shrouded in uncertainty and a Member 
State exercises its discretion in a 
14 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany; Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and 
Others (No 46 & 48/93), Report for the Hearing, [1996] ECR I-1034, (1996) 1 CML Rev 889, para 57 
[here reproducing a statement by the Commission and by the Danish and UK governments]. 
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reasonable way, it would seem 
unreasonable for it to incur liability if it 
is later held that Community law 
precludes the national law or 
administrative practice in question. 
Unblameworthy legal mistakes should 
not lead to liability to make reparation.” 
 
 
PDF version, page 12: “Existing investment 
agreements generally do not regulate or 
address the relationship with domestic courts 
or other ISDS tribunals. Some agreements 
require that the investor choses between 
domestic courts and ISDS tribunals. This is 
often referred to as ‘fork in the road’ clause.” 
 
 
The Commission’s model, as reflected by the 
CETA, does not include a fork-in-the-road 
clause. This is discussed further below.    
 
Incidentally, arbitrators have in most cases not 
given effect to fork-in-the-road clauses. This is 
another example of why it is a bad idea to 
continue to rely on arbitrators to apply the 
treaties. 
 
In particular, the arbitrators have in the great 
majority of cases not applied fork-in-the-road 
clauses to preclude a treaty claim (where the 
claimant or a related party had previously 
resorted to domestic courts).15 This highlights 
the arbitrators’ tendency to adopt expansive 
approaches even in the face of express 




PDF version, page 12: “As a matter of 




This is a misleading statement unless one reads 
a lot into the Commission’s qualifier “[a]s a 
matter of principle”. 
 
If the Commission wanted to “favour” 
domestic courts, it could easily do so. It could 
require foreign investors – like any other 
foreign national – to go first to domestic courts 
where the courts offer justice and are 
reasonably-available. Instead, the Commission 
has declined to include this duty. This assumes 
that domestic courts are potentially biased, 
unreliable, etc. in all situations where a foreign 
investor brings a claim. This aspect of the 
15 Van Harten (2013) p gb forks in road. 
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CETA contrasts starkly with the Commission’s 
statement in the consultation text. 
 
 
PDF version, page 12: “The EU aims to 
provide incentives for investors to pursue 
claims in domestic courts or to seek amicable 
solutions – such as mediation. The EU will 
suggest different instruments to do this. One is 
to prolong the relevant time limits if an 
investor goes to domestic courts or mediation 
on the same matter, so as not to discourage an 
investor from pursuing these avenues.” 
 
 
This is a weak way to “provide incentives” for 
investors to pursue claims in domestic courts 
or reach “amicable settlements”. Indeed, the 
Commission says only that it seeks “not to 
discourage” foreign investors from resorting to 
domestic courts or settlement. To incent the 
use of domestic courts, a foreign investor 
should be required to show that domestic 
courts are not reasonably-available. 
 
On settlements, one person’s amicable 
settlement is another person’s regulatory chill. 
Even the fact of a settlement may not be public 
if the settlement was reached before the foreign 
investor filed its formal request for 
consultations (see Canada-EU CETA, Article 
x-33(2)). In this way, the Commission’s 
approach is “not to discourage” governments 
from secretly paying public funds or chilling 




PDF version, page 12: “Another important 
element is to make sure that investors cannot 
bring claims on the same matter at the same 
time in front of an ISDS tribunal and domestic 
courts. The EU will also ensure that companies 
affiliated with the investor cannot bring claims 
in front of an ISDS tribunal and domestic 




The Commission’s approach allows foreign 
investors to have their cake and eat it too. 
Foreign investors will be free to pursue public 
compensation in investor-state arbitration 
(where compensation is the primary remedy). 
They will also be free to pursue non-monetary 
orders in domestic courts (where compensation 
is usually a secondary remedy in claims against 
the state). 
 
Thus, the Commission entrenches and expands 
the advantages for foreign investors, relative to 
all others, due to their special right to pursue 
investor-state arbitration. 
 
The Commission’s approach essentially tracks 
NAFTA, which also requires foreign investors 
to pursue monetary remedies in investor-state 
arbitration or domestic courts but not both. 
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That is all. To be clear, this is not a duty to 
exhaust reasonably-available local remedies or 
a true fork-in-the-road clause. By the way, 
based on the existing record of arbitrator 
decision-making,16 the former and especially 
the latter should not be treated as a reliable 
way to avoid parallel treaty proceedings if left 
in the hands of arbitrators who have a financial 
stake in allowing a treaty claim to proceed. 
 
 
PDF version, page 12: “If there are other 
relevant or related cases, ISDS tribunals must 
take these into account. This is done to avoid 
any risk that the investor is over-compensated 
and helps to ensure consistency by excluding 
the possibility for parallel claims.” 
 
 
This is another weak response to the problem 
of parallel treaty proceedings. It is standard 
practice in any adjudicative process for the 
adjudicator to be able to take into account other 
relevant cases. That the Commission would 
find it necessary to make this statement is 
revealing of the track record of arbitrators. 
 
Above all, an arbitrator can easily take into 
account (and distinguish) other cases to suit 
some instrumental purpose. What is needed is 
a judicial system that is subject to jurisdictional 
review, appeals, conflict-of-interest challenges, 




General response to Question 8: Arbitrator ethics, conduct and qualifications 
 
Question: [P]lease provide your views on these procedures and in particular on the Code of 
Conduct and the requirements for the qualifications for arbitrators in relation to the TTIP 
agreement. Do they improve the existing system and can further improvements be envisaged? 
 
The Commission’s proposals on this issue are a major disappointment. They do not acknowledge 
the institutional reasons for the lack of independence and impartiality in investor-state 
arbitration. In turn, they lead only to limited and inadequate tweaks. 
 
In particular, the Commission makes no commitment to incorporate the essential safeguards of 
judicial independence that are present in other adjudicative systems that review sovereign 
conduct. These include: 
 
(a) secure tenure for the adjudicator instead of case-by-case appointments, 
(b) set remuneration by the state instead of for-profit case-by-case appointment, 
16 Van Harten (2013) p Gb record on parallel claims. 
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(c) an objective method of case assignment instead of executive discretion over case-by-
case appointment, 
(d) prohibitions on outside lawyering by the adjudicators instead of widespread double-
dipping and issue conflict, and 
(e) a judicial process to resolve conflict-of-interest claims instead of a process controlled 
by executive officials. 
 
Clearly, the Commission is not going to ensure that investor-state arbitration is made 
independent and impartial at an institutional level. Thus, there will remain a basis for reasonable 
suspicions of bias in the system. 
 
The Commission needs to do the obvious: replace financially-dependent arbitrators with proper 
judges. Why has it not done so? 
 
Specific response to Question 8: Arbitrator ethics, conduct and qualifications 
 
 






PDF version, page 12: “There is concern that 
arbitrators on ISDS tribunals do not always act 
in an independent and impartial manner. 
Because the individuals in question may not 
only act as arbitrators, but also as lawyers for 
companies or governments, concerns have 




The Commission states the concern about lack 
of arbitrator independence and impartiality in 
narrow terms. The real concern arises from the 
institutional structure of investor-state 
arbitration. It is not just a matter of the conduct 
of individual arbitrators. 
 
In the absence of the usual institutional 
safeguards of judicial independence – such as 
secure tenure, set remuneration, objective case 
assignments, prohibitions on outside 
lawyering, and a judicial process to resolve 
conflict-of-interest claims – reasonable 
perceptions of arbitrator bias arise. The 
perceptions of bias may operate in favour of an 
investor or a state depending on the 
circumstances. 
 
For example, because arbitrators are appointed 
on a case-by-case basis (and paid lucratively 
by the appointment), all of them – and all 
lawyers who litigate the cases – depend on 
whoever has the ability to make the claims and 
trigger the arbitrators’ appointments. In the 
present one-way system, only foreign investors 
have this ability. 
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Also, if they want to be re-appointed, the 
arbitrators depend on those with the power to 
appoint an arbitrator when the disputing parties 
do not agree or do not appoint. In the Canada-
EU CETA, the Commission would give this 
vital power to the Secretary General of ICSID. 
This person is an international executive 
official appointed via a nomination of the 
World Bank President and a majority vote of 
the states-parties to the ICSID Convention. 
 
It offends judicial independence to give an 
executive official the power to choose who will 
decide a case after the official knows who has 
sued whom and in what context. The issue here 
is not actual bias. It is the reasonable suspicion 
that the executive official will favour investors 
over states, some investors over other 
investors, or some states over other states. For 
example, the ICSID Secretary-General owes 
his or her position to the World Bank President 
who is largely and effectively an appointee of 
the U.S. Administration. 
 
This allocation of appointing power is 
comparable to historical contracts between 
U.S. firms and Caribbean countries that 
provided for arbitration (under the contract) 
with default appointing power exercised by to 
the U.S. Secretary of State. At present, the 
Commission proposes to give appointing 
power – in arbitrations by U.S. companies 
against Europe or by European companies 
against the U.S. – to an executive official who 
is connected to the U.S. Administration. It is an 
open question why the EU would take this 
approach instead of an independent process in 
which judges were assigned to cases by an 
objective method such as lottery or rotation. 
 
These are not the only inappropriate 
dependencies of arbitrators. One may 
reasonably suspect – based on the economic 
incentives of arbitrators – that arbitrators also 
depend on senior gatekeepers in the arbitration 
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industry or on powerful governments that push 
treaties providing for investor-state arbitration. 
The resulting suspicions may operate in favour 
of some investors or states and against others. 
 
The essential problem arises from the decision 
not to have institutional safeguards of judicial 
independence in the final resolution of disputes 
about public law, public policy, and public 
finances. Institutional safeguards are vital in 
this context because the disputes always affect 
third parties and the public. There is no 
compelling reason to use arbitrators instead 
judges to make the important decisions in 
investor-state arbitration. 
 
As an aside, it is important to highlight a form 
of conflict of interest – so-called issue conflict 
– that is widespread in the system. Issue 
conflict arises because arbitrators are allowed 
to work concurrently as lawyers in investor-
state arbitration. Many arbitrators act regularly 
as arbitrators and lawyers and, presumably, 
often rule on issues that are of interest to a 
paying client in another case. 
 
It is impossible to know whether issue conflict 
has arisen in any particular case because many 
investor-state arbitrations are confidential. 
Unless the arbitrator declares it, a party or 
member of the public will not be able to 
examine the arbitrator’s role as counsel in 
another case. Indeed, all of the cases arguably 
raise similar issues because all of them require 
the arbitrators to resolve jurisdictional issues 
such as the definition of “investment” and 
“investor”. 
 
In this respect, the absence of a basic 
institutional safeguard of independence puts all 
arbitrators who work as arbitrators and lawyers 
in the system in a conflict-of interest. 
 
The Commission does not discuss these and 
other problems arising from the institutional 
structure. The Commission does not avert to 
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the role of institutional safeguards as a basis 
for judicial independence. Instead, the 
Commission focuses on the conduct of 
individual arbitrators. This is a bad sign. It 
signals that none of the Commission’s reforms 
will address the systemic taint that follows 




PDF version, page 13: “Most existing 
investment agreements do not address the issue 
of the conduct or behaviour of arbitrators. 
International rules on arbitration address the 
issue by allowing the responding government 
or the investor to challenge the choice of 
arbitrator because of concerns of suitability.” 
 
 
Clearly, the Commission is not proposing to 
adopt the necessary institutional safeguards of 
independence other than some very limited 
measures. 
 
For example, the provision for conflict-of-
interest challenges is a re-packaging of existing 
processes in ICSID arbitration. It allows the 
Secretary General of ICSID, an executive 
official, to decide conflict-of-interest 
challenges against arbitrators. This offends 
judicial independence. A judicial process 
requires that judges make the decisions and, in 
turn, that a conflict-of-interest challenge to a 
judge is decided by other judges. 
 
A related problem is that there are no rules of 
procedure in investor-state arbitration that 
reproduce the independence and fairness of a 
judicial proceeding. For reasons of 
independence and fairness, the rules must be 
applied by judges. Such rules could be 
included in a new treaty like the CETA but 
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PDF version, page 13: “The EU aims to 
establish clear rules to ensure that arbitrators 
are independent and act ethically. The EU will 
introduce specific requirements in the TTIP on 
the ethical conduct of arbitrators, including a 
code of conduct. This code of conduct will be 
binding on arbitrators in ISDS tribunals set up 
under TTIP. The code of conduct also 
establishes procedures to identify and deal with 
any conflicts of interest.” 
 
 
The utility of a code of conduct depends on its 
content and enforcement. For example, will the 
Commission’s proposed code be applied by an 
independent judge or an executive official? 
Will it preclude the dual roles of arbitrator as 
lawyers? Unfortunately, the Commission has 
not released any code of conduct or, it appears, 
included a code in the CETA. 
 
If the Commission could not manage a code of 
conduct in a treaty with Canada (whose own 
Agreement on Internal Trade has a code of 
conduct written into its mechanism for person-
to-government arbitration), why would one 
think that the Commission would include a 
code in the TTIP? 
 
Most importantly, a code of conduct, even if 
binding, is not a substitute for other 




PDF version, page 13: “Failure to abide by 
these ethical rules will result in the removal of 
the arbitrator from the tribunal. For example, if 
a responding state considers that the arbitrator 
chosen by the investor does not have the 
necessary qualifications or that he has a 
conflict of interest, the responding state can 
challenge the appointment. If the arbitrator is 
in breach of the Code of Conduct, he/she will 
be removed from the tribunal. In case the ISDS 
tribunal has already rendered its award and a 
breach of the code of conduct is found, the 
responding state or the investor can request a 
reversal of that ISDS finding.” 
 
 
The integrity of any process for conflict-of-
interest challenges depends on who decides the 
challenges. The Commission does not mention 
here that, in the Canada-EU CETA (Article x-
25(10)), the challenges will be decided by an 
executive official, the Secretary-General of 
ICSID. 
 
This highlights the lack of integrity in investor-
state arbitration. In essence, it re-assigns 
judicial power from courts to a mix of for-
profit arbitrators and executive officials. These 
other actors do not have the claims to 
institutional independence of a judge who is 
subject to the usual safeguards. 
 
 
PDF version, page 13: “In the text provided as 
reference (the draft EU-Canada Agreement), 
the Parties (i.e. the EU and Canada) have 
agreed for the first time in an investment 
agreement to include rules on the conduct of 
 
The Commission should have released the 
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arbitrators, and have included the possibility to 
improve them further if necessary. In the 
context of TTIP these would be directly 
included in the agreement.” 
 
 
PDF version, page 12: “Some have also 
expressed concerns about the qualifications of 
arbitrators and that they may not have the 
necessary qualifications on matters of public 
interest or on matters that require a balancing 
between investment protection and e.g. 
environment, health or consumer 
protection….” 
 
PDF version, page 13: “As regards the 
qualifications of ISDS arbitrators, the EU aims 
to set down detailed requirements for the 
arbitrators who act in ISDS tribunals under 
TTIP. They must be independent and impartial, 
with expertise in international law and 
international investment law and, if possible, 
experience in international trade law and 
international dispute resolution. Among those 
best qualified and who have undertaken such 
tasks will be retired judges, who generally have 
experience in ruling on issues that touch upon 
both trade and investment and on societal and 
public policy issues.” 
 
 
First, the Commission identifies a legitimate 
concern that arbitrator lack “the necessary 
qualifications on matters of public interest or 
on matters that require a balancing between 
investment protection and e.g. environment, 
health or consumer protection.” Yet it responds 
by continuing the usual practice of requiring 
arbitrators to have expertise in international 
law, international investment law, and 
international trade law. The Commission does 
not institute any requirement for qualifications 
in the affected area of decision-making, such as 
environment, health or consumer protection. 
 
Second, the Commission suggests that retired 
judges may be well-suited to the role of 
investor-state arbitrator or may have relevant 
experience in deciding policy disputes. Yet the 
Commission does not take the logical step of 
requiring all arbitrators to be judges and to 
have relevant policy expertise. 
 
Third, the Commission does not mention the 
problem that a retired judge who actively seeks 
re-appointment as an arbitrator is affected by 
the same economic interest that gives rise to 
appearances of bias among other arbitrators. 
 
Fourth, a statement that someone will be 
independent is obviously not a substitute for 
institutional safeguards of their independence. 
Thus, a declaration by states, an arbitrator, or 
anyone else that arbitrators “must be 
independent and impartial” is of little value 
where the institutional structure creates 
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PDF version, page 13: “The EU also aims to 
set up a roster, i.e. a list of qualified 
individuals from which the Chairperson for the 
ISDS tribunal is drawn, if the investor or the 
responding state cannot otherwise agree to a 
Chairperson. The purpose of such a roster is to 
ensure that the EU and the US have agreed to 
and vetted the arbitrators to ensure their 
abilities and independence. In this way the 
responding state chooses one arbitrator and has 
vetted the third arbitrator.” 
 
 
A roster could be a key element of a project to 
judicialize investor-state arbitration. Yet the 
Commission’s proposal for a roster has fatal 
flaws. 
 
First, we are told little about the roster. This 
makes it impossible to evaluate its 
effectiveness to ensure independence and 
proper qualifications. Will the roster members 
have secure tenure and a set salary? Will they 
be barred from work as a lawyer during and 
after their service on the roster? 
 
Second, what we are told in the Canada-EU 
CETA is not reassuring. The roster will apply 
to presiding arbitrators only. This leaves it 
open to states, investors, and appointing 
authorities to choose unqualified individuals 
who have not been vetted and have 
inappropriate economic incentives. 
 
Also, an executive official (the Secretary 
General of ICSID) will choose who is 
appointed from the roster to individual cases. 
As a result, the roster is not judicial. It lacks an 
objective method of case assignment. 
 
Further, the Secretary General of ICSID will be 
able to appoint arbitrators from outside the 
roster if the states parties to the treaty have not 
agreed on the roster members. In the NAFTA 
context, a similar roster of presiding arbitrators 
was proposed but left un-filled and then never 
used. This is a major loophole in the CETA. 
 
Thus, even based on what little we know about 
the roster, it will not address the lack of 
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General response to Question 9: Reducing the risk of frivolous and unfounded cases 
 
Question: Please provide your views on [the Commission’s proposed] mechanisms for the 
avoidance of frivolous or unfounded claims and the removal of incentives in relation to the TTIP 
agreement. Please also indicate any other means to limit frivolous or unfounded claims.  
 
The Commission’s approach leaves it to arbitrators – who would earn significant income if the 
claim proceeded – to weed out frivolous claims. Obviously, frivolous claims should be vetted by 
someone who does not have a financial stake in the outcome of the decision to vet. The 
Commission has also not addressed similar issues that arise in the context of parallel treaty 
proceedings. 
 
The Commission’s provision for cost-shifting is helpful but will not affect the key cases: those in 
which a deep-pocketed company brings a claim involving large sums. Whether frivolous or not, 
such cases create pressure on governments to settle – including by regulatory chill – to avoid 
even a low risk of potentially vast fiscal liability. This is an essential feature of the special rights 
and advantages of foreign investors in investor-state arbitration. 
 
Specific response to Question 9: Reducing the risk of frivolous and unfounded cases 
 
 






PDF version, page 14: “As in all legal 
systems, cases are brought that have little or no 
chance of succeeding (so-called “frivolous 
claims”). Despite eventually being rejected by 
the tribunals, such cases take up time and 
money for the responding state. There have 
been concerns that protracted and frequent 
litigation in ISDS could have an effect on the 
policy choices made by states.” 
 
 
The Commission is right to highlight this 
concern. That said, it is not always the case, as 
suggested by the Commission, that frivolous 
claims are rejected by tribunals. 
 
Further, the rationale for weeding out frivolous 
claims also applies to parallel treaty 
proceedings. In many cases, arbitrators have 
taken advantage of ambiguous treaty language 
to allow parallel claims. As discussed under 
Question 7 above, the Commission has not 
addressed this problem. 
 
 
PDF version, page 14: “Another issue is the 
cost of ISDS proceedings. In many ISDS cases, 
even if the responding state is successful in 
defending its measures in front of the ISDS 
tribunal, it may have to pay substantial 
amounts to cover its own defence.” 
 
 
The Commission is right to highlight the 
excessive cost of investor-state arbitration. The 
costs are partly the result of arbitrators’ 
expansive interpretations. The weeding out of 
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PDF version, page 14: “Under existing 
investment agreements, there are generally no 
rules dealing with frivolous claims.” 
 
 
This is misleading. Any adjudicator has an 
ability to weed out frivolous claims. It is not a 
new step to give tribunals this power. The only 
novelty of the Commission’s approach, 
following the U.S. lead in other treaties such as 
CAFTA, is to include an express mechanism 
for reviewing frivolous claims. 
 
Incidentally, this reform highlights that 
virtually any procedural or substantive problem 
in the system can be addressed by express 
language in the treaty. 
 
 
PDF version, page 14: “Some arbitration rules 
however do have provisions on frivolous 
claims. As a result, there is a risk that frivolous 
or clearly unfounded claims are allowed to 
proceed. Even though the investor would lose 
such claims, the long proceedings and the 




It is highly doubtful that all frivolous claims 
have been lost by the investor. For example, 
did the investor lose in the St. Mary’s NAFTA 
arbitration against Canada, which was settled 
after the federal government argued that the 
claimant had manufactured its U.S. nationality 
and had no right to sue? In the settlement of 
that case, a provincial government paid $15 
million to St. Mary’s to settle all ongoing and 
future litigation in the dispute.17 If the NAFTA 
claim was frivolous, as the federal government 
argued, it certainly was also fruitful for the 
investor. 
 
The arbitrators have taken an expansive 
approach to many issues in the treaties. This 
raises the question of what one means by 
frivolous. It also highlights the link between 
the arbitrators’ extension of their power into 
new areas and, as the Commission puts it, 
“implied questions surrounding policy”. 
 
 
PDF version, page 14: 
 
“The EU will introduce several instruments in 
TTIP to quickly dismiss frivolous claims.  
 
ISDS tribunals will be required to dismiss 
 
This is a weak response to the in-built 
structural bias in favour of claimants and, 
specifically, frivolous claims. First, tribunals 
will not be “required” to dismiss claims; they 
will only be given an express power and 
process to do so. 
17 Government of Ontario, press release (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 8 March 2013).  
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claims that are obviously without legal merit or 
legally unfounded. For example, this would be 
cases where the investor is not established in 
the US or the EU, or cases where the ISDS 
tribunal can quickly establish that there is in 
fact no discrimination between domestic and 
foreign investors. This provides an early and 
effective filtering mechanism for frivolous 




Second, the Commission gives arbitrators the 
power to decide whether a case in which they 
will earn significant income should go ahead. 
This creates an obvious conflict-of-interest. 
Frivolous claims should be vetted by one who 
has no financial stake in the outcome of the 
decision to vet. 
 
 
PDF version, page 14: “To further discourage 
unfounded claims, the EU is proposing that the 
losing party should bear all costs of the 
proceedings. So if investors take a chance at 
bringing certain claims and fail, they have to 
pay the full financial costs of this attempt.” 
 
 
This is a positive development, especially due 
to the growth in speculative financing of 
claims by outside actors. On the other hand, it 
will not affect the most important scenario 
where a deep-pocketed company brings a claim 
involving large sums. Whether frivolous or 
not, such cases always create pressure on the 
state to settle – including by regulatory chill – 
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General response to Question 10: Allowing claims to proceed (filter) 
 
Question: [W]hat are your views on the use and scope of such filter mechanisms in the TTIP 
agreement?  
 
The Commission’s filter mechanisms, following the U.S. lead, are positive. However, there is no 
principled reason to defend the right to regulate for the financial sector only. Joint screening of 
claims by relevant regulators in the host state and home state should be available for all claims. 
This would put a useful check against abuse of arbitrator power, especially since the 
Commission plans to rely on for-profit arbitrators and does not affirm the right to regulate 
effectively. The filter mechanisms are also limited because they require the consent of both states 
parties. They are not a substitute for a clear and unequivocal statement of the state’s right to 
regulate in the treaty.  
 
Specific response to Question 10: Allowing claims to proceed (filter) 
 
 






PDF version, page 15: “The majority of 
existing investment agreements privilege the 
original intention of such agreements, which 
was to avoid the politicisation of disputes, and 
therefore do not contain provisions or 
mechanisms which allow the Parties the 
possibility to intervene under particular 
circumstances in ISDS cases.” 
 
 
Investor-state arbitration is not depoliticized 
when an executive official has the power to 
decide who should be the judge in a particular 
case. This allows the priorities of the executive 
to infiltrate the adjudicative process. De-
politicization requires a process that is 
independent of the executive (and other 
powerful actors). 
 
At present, investor-state arbitration depends 
on the actual or perceived preferences of 
executive officials. All the arbitrators are 
chosen either by executive officials directly or 
by the disputing parties against the backdrop of 
executive appointing power. 
 
 
PDF version, page 15: “The EU like many 
other states considers it important to protect the 
right to regulate in the financial sector and, 
more broadly, the overriding need to maintain 
the overall stability and integrity of the 
financial system, while also recognizing the 




Presumably the Commission considers it 
important to protect the right to regulate 
beyond the financial sector. Why has it not 
allowed joint screening, by the relevant 
regulators in the host and home states, for all 
claims by investors? 
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General response to Question 11: 
Guidance by the Parties (the EU and the US) on the interpretation of the agreement 
 
Question: [P]lease provide your views on [the Commission’s proposed] approach to ensure 
uniformity and predictability in the interpretation of the agreement to correct the balance? Are 
these elements desirable, and if so, do you consider them to be sufficient?  
 
It should be standard practice to allow submissions and agreed interpretations by the states 
parties, using express terms in the treaty. That said, neither mechanism is reliable to ensure 
uniformity and predictability. 
 
In the NAFTA context, where these mechanisms have a long history, tribunals have decided 
against the joint submissions of states parties. Also, agreed interpretations have been used only 
twice under NAFTA; in a third instance, a proposed interpretation was blocked by one state 
party. Thus, the mechanisms have proven to be a limited response to the lack of uniformity and 
predictability and to other concerns about arbitrator decision-making. 
 
Most importantly, neither mechanism addresses the lack of independence, fairness, and balance 
in investor-state arbitration. 
 
Specific response to Question 11: 
Guidance by the Parties (the EU and the US) on the interpretation of the agreement 
 
 






PDF version, page 15-16: “When countries 
negotiate an agreement, they have a common 
understanding of what they want the agreement 
to mean. However, there is a risk that any 
tribunal, including ISDS tribunals interprets 
the agreement in a different way, upsetting the 
balance that the countries in question had 
achieved in negotiations – for example, 
between investment protection and the right to 
regulate. This is the case if the agreement 
leaves room for interpretation.” 
 
 
The Commission is right to highlight this issue. 
Yet the Commission downplays the tendency 
of arbitrators to expand their power. It has been 
common for arbitrators to adopt expansive 
approaches even in the face of relatively clear 
language in the treaty. 
 
This emphasizes the need to replace arbitrators 
with judges who are institutionally independent 
of a financial incentive to favour claimants, 
executive officials, senior gatekeepers, etc. 
 
 
PDF version, page 16: 
 
“It is therefore necessary to have mechanisms 
which will allow the Parties (the EU and the 
 
This is prudent in the face of unchecked 
arbitrator power. However, neither mechanism 
is reliable to ensure uniformity and 
predictability. Also, neither mechanism is new; 
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US) to clarify their intentions on how the 
agreement should be interpreted…. 
 
The EU will make it possible for the non-
disputing Party (i.e. the EU or the US) to 
intervene in ISDS proceedings between an 
investor and the other Party. This means that in 
each case, the Parties can explain to the 
arbitrators and to the Appellate Body how they 
would want the relevant provisions to be 
interpreted. Where both Parties agree on the 
interpretation, such interpretation is a very 
powerful statement, which ISDS tribunals 
would have to respect.  
 
The EU would also provide for the Parties (i.e. 
the EU and the US) to adopt binding 
interpretations on issues of law, so as to correct 
or avoid interpretations by tribunals which 
might be considered to be against the common 
intentions of the EU and the US. Given the 
EU’s intention to give clarity and precision to 
the investment protection obligations of the 
agreement, the scope for undesirable 
interpretations by ISDS tribunals is very 
limited. However, this provision is an 
additional safety-valve for the Parties.” 
 
both have been a part of the U.S. approach 
since at least 1994. 
 
On submissions by the states parties, in the 
NAFTA context, tribunals in various cases 
have declined to adopt the shared 
interpretations of the affected states (i.e. the 
home and host state of the investor, or even all 
states parties). 
 
Second, the mechanism of agreed 
interpretations has been a limited way to 
manage the arbitrators’ power. In the NAFTA 
context, the mechanism has been used very 
rarely and has always left room for an 
arbitrator to avoid the intended effect in future 
cases. 
 
To make the process more credible and 
uniform, judges should be charged with 
interpreting and applying the treaties – 
including any agreed interpretations. 
 
Finally, the Commission’s statement that “the 
scope for undesirable interpretations by ISDS 
tribunals is very limited” is not credible. It 
reminds me of the king who sent the palace 
guard to defend against a sand storm. There are 
numerous examples of arbitrators’ taking 
advantage of treaty ambiguity in order to 
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General response to Question 12: Appellate Mechanism and consistency of rulings 
 
Question: [P]lease provide your views on the creation of an appellate mechanism in TTIP as a 
means to ensure uniformity and predictability in the interpretation of the agreement.  
 
The idea of an appellate body is not new. It has been floated in the U.S. for at least 10 years but 
now appears to be a dead issue there. If the Commission was serious about an appellate body, 
why not insist on one in the Canada-EU CETA? Canada is a much weaker negotiating partner 
than the U.S. 
 
Even if an appellate body could be negotiated, it would leave intact the role of for-profit 
arbitrators in deciding disputes. For this and other reasons, it would not address the lack of 
independence and fairness in the system. The arbitrators should be replaced with judges 
throughout the process with at least one level of appellate judicial review. Otherwise, one may 
have more uniformity and predictability that remains tainted by the lack of basic integrity in the 
decision-making process. 
 
Specific response to Question 12: Appellate Mechanism and consistency of rulings 
 
 






PDF version, page 16: “In existing investment 
agreements, the decision by an ISDS tribunal is 
final. There is no possibility for the responding 
state, for example, to appeal to a higher 
instance to challenge the level of compensation 
or other aspects of the ISDS decision except on 
very limited procedural grounds. There are 
concerns that this can lead to different or even 
contradictory interpretations of the provisions 
of international investment agreements. There 
have been calls by stakeholders for a 
mechanism to allow for appeal to increase 
legitimacy of the system and to ensure 
uniformity of interpretation.” 
 
 
The Commission does not mention that there is 
no possibility for review in any domestic or 
international court under the ICSID Rules. 
Instead, the arbitrators’ decisions are reviewed 
by a committee of three other arbitrators, all 
appointed by the World Bank President. The 
World Bank President is an executive official 
who is chosen primarily and effectively by the 
U.S. Administration. This challenge to judicial 
independence is a bigger problem than the lack 
of uniformity of interpretation. 
 
In any event, the Commission could address 
both problems by replacing arbitrators with 




PDF version, page 17: “No existing 
international investment agreements provide 
for an appeal on legal issues. International 
arbitration rules allow for annulment of ISDS 
rulings under certain very restrictive conditions 
 
The Commission is right to highlight the 
limited options for review of arbitrator 
decisions. As discussed earlier, the arbitrators’ 
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PDF version, page 17: “The EU aims to 
establish an appellate mechanism in TTIP so as 
to allow for review of ISDS rulings. It will 
help ensure consistency in the interpretation of 
TTIP and provide both the government and the 
investor with the opportunity to appeal against 
awards and to correct errors. This legal review 
is an additional check on the work of the 
arbitrators who have examined the case in the 
first place.  
 
In agreements under negotiation by the EU, the 
possibility of creating an appellate mechanism 
in the future is envisaged. However, in TTIP 
the EU intends to go further and create a 
bilateral appellate mechanism immediately 
through the agreement.” 
 
 
An appellate body would be a positive step. 
Yet it would not address the lack of 
independence and fairness in investor-state 
arbitration if the arbitrators were not replaced 
with judges throughout the process. 
 
The Commission has not obtained an appellate 
mechanism in the Canada-EU CETA. This was 
presumably an ideal context in which to 
introduce such a mechanism in anticipation of 
TTIP. Why would one expect the Commission 
to deliver an appellate mechanism with the 




Response to Question 13 (General assessment) 
 
Question: What is your overall assessment of the proposed approach on substantive standards of 
protection and ISDS as a basis for investment negotiations between the EU and US?  
 
The Commission’s approach has a few positive elements. Overall, it is a failure. The 
Commission does not affirm clearly and unequivocally the state’s right to regulate. It does not 
introduce actionable responsibilities for foreign investors alongside their elaborate rights. It does 
not require foreign investors to resort to domestic courts where the courts offer justice and are 
reasonably-available. In turn, the Commission’s approach discriminates in favour of foreign 
investors – by giving them a special status in their relationship to legislatures, governments, and 
courts – and against other rights holders and the public interest. The Commission takes positive 
steps on transparency but does not address the lack of institutional independence and procedural 
fairness in investor-state arbitration. In important respects, the Commission makes these 
problems worse. 
 
Question: Do you see other ways for the EU to improve the investment system?  
 
The clearest and most defensible step is to remove investor-state arbitration from the treaties. 
The exceptional use of arbitration to resolve disputes about sovereign conduct and access to 
public funds is flawed due to the lack of the usual safeguards of independence, openness, and 
fairness and the lack of balance in the allocation of rights and responsibilities. The Commission’s 
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proposed reforms take meaningful steps only on openness. They do little to address the other 
flaws and in important respects make them worse. 
 
Question: Are there any other issues related to the topics covered by the questionnaire that you 
would like to address? 
 
The consultation should have addressed the key question of whether to include investor-state 
arbitration in the TTIP. This flaw in the consultation was discussed at the outset of this comment. 
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